Bulletins

OF CANADA                                            DU CANADA   

             BULLETIN  OF                                          BULLETIN DES

             PROCEEDINGS                                          PROCÉDURES

January 23, 1998  65 - 143 (INDEX)                                                     le 23 janvier 1998

CONTENTS                                                   TABLE DES MATIÈRES

L.C.

Mary A. Marshall

Cook, Duke, Cox

v. (26358)

Brian Joseph Mills (Alta.)

Dennis Edney

Edney, Hattersley, Dolphin

FILING DATE 29.12.1998

La Commission scolaire Kativik

Robert Mainville

Robert Mainville et Associés

c. (26390)

Claude H. Foisy et al. (Qué.)

Claude H. Foisy

DATE DE PRODUCTION 16.12.1997

Micheline Thibodeau

Douglas C. Mitchell

Colin Irving & Associés

c. (26391)

Ville de Sept-Îles et al. (Qué.)

Jean Carol Boucher

Boucher & Associés

DATE DE PRODUCTION 22.12.1997

Royal Bank of Canada et al.

Brian P. O’Leary

Burnet, Duckworth & Palmer

v. (26392)

Sprung Instant Structures Ltd. (Alta.)

Blair R. Carbert

MacKimmie Matthews

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

Khandker Shamsul Hoque

Raymond F. Wagner

Wagner & Associates

v. (26393)

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada, a body corporate et al. (N.S.)

Alan V. Parish, Q.C.

Green Parish

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

The Minister of Forests et al.

Gillian P. Wallace, Q.C.

Min. of the A.G.

v. (26394)

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. et al. (B.C.)

David R. Boyd

FILING DATE 7.1.1998

A & L Investments Ltd. et al.

Richard E. Shibley

Shibley Righton

v. (26395)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of the Province of Ontario, as represented by the Minister of Housing and the Attorney-General (Ont.)

Tom Marshall

A.G. of Ontario

FILING DATE 15.12.1997

Highmark Residences Inc.

John T. Morin, Q.C.

Fasken Campbell Godfrey

v. (26396)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of Ontario (Ont.)

Tom Marshall

A.G. of Ontario

FILING DATE 15.12.1997

Madison Developments Ltd. et al.

David T. Stockwood, Q.C.

Stockwood, Spies & Campbell

v. (26397)

Plan Electric Co. et al. (Ont.)

Harvey Poss, Q.C.

Poss & Halfnight

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc.

Hugues G. Richard

Léger Robic Richard, g.p.

v. (26403)

American Business Information, Inc. (F.C.A.)(Qué.)

Roger T. Hughes, Q.C.

Sim, Hughes, Ashton & McKay

DATE DE PRODUCTION 23.12.1997

Leonard V. Gray

Leonard V. Gray

v. (26410)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of the province of Ontario (Ont.)

James D.G. Douglas

Borden & Elliot

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

Syndicat canadien de la Fonction publique, section locale 60

Joël Michaud

Pink Breen Larkin

c. (26414)

Ville d’Edmundston (N.-B.)

James A. Connely

James A. Connely, Avocat & Notaire

DATE DE PRODUCTION 24.12.1997

John Thomas Malmberg et al.

P.E. James Prentice, Q.C.

Rooney Prentice

v. (26402)

Municipal District of Cardston No. 6 (Alta.)

T.D. Marriott

Brownlee Fryett

FILING DATE 19.12.1997

Free World Trust

Louis Masson

Joli-Coeur, Lacasse, Lemieux, Simard, St-Pierre

c. (26406)

Électro Santé Inc. et al. (Qué.)

Jean Lagacé

DATE DE PRODUCTION 22.12.1997

Lai Ling Yammie Kwan

G. Greg Brodsky, Q.C.

Walsh Micay and Company

v. (26408)

Her Majesty The Queen (Man.)

Gregg Lawlor

Public Prosecutions

FILING DATE 2.1.1998

Erwin Franz Sillipp

Douglas H. Christie

v. (26409)

Her Majesty The Queen (Alta.)

Jack Watson

Alberta Dept. of Justice

FILING DATE 8.1.1998

William D. Doherty et al.

Richard J. Scott

Allen Dixon Bell

v. (26411)

Shirley Jean Doherty et al. (N.B.)

J. Shawn O’Toole

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

Agbariya Shoshana et al.

Martin Teplitsky, Q.C.

Teplitsky, Colson

v. (26412)

Townsgate 1 Limited et al. (Ont.)

Allan Sternberg

Goodman & Carr

FILING DATE 19.12.1997

Deloitte & Touche Inc.

Gary Meschishnick

Wallace Meschishnick Clackson Zawada

v. (26413)

Her Majesty The Queen in the right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Revenue et al. (Sask.)

Gordon Berscheid

Dept. of Justice

FILING DATE 22.12.1997

Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd.

David F. McEwen

McEwen, Schmitt & Co.

v. (26415)

Can-Dive Services Ltd. (B.C.)

D. Barry Kirkham, Q.C.

Owen, Bird

FILING DATE 29.12.1997

Jean Victor Beaulac

David O. Griffiths

Wilson & Buck

v. (26416)

Her Majesty The Queen (B.C.)

William F. Ehrcke

Min. of the A.G.

FILING DATE 29.12.1997

Ernst Zündel

Douglas R. Christie

v. (26417)

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (F.C.A.)(Crim.)(B.C.)

Donald J. Rennie

Dept. of Justice

FILING DATE 23.12.1997

Power Workers’ Union et al.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg

Gowling, Strathy & Henderson

v. (26418)

Lincoln Hydro Electric Commission et al. (Ont.)

Robert Doumani

Gardiner, Roberts

FILING DATE 23.12.1997

Air Canada

W.A. Kelly, Q.C.

Kelly Affleck Greene

v. (26421)

Ticketnet Corp. (Ont.)

Dennis O’Connor, Q.C.

Borden & Elliot

FILING DATE 14.1.1998

Deposit Insurance Corp. of Ontario

Thomas R. Lederer

Genest Murray Desbrisay Lamek

v. (26422)

Nesbitt, Burns Ltd. et al. (Ont.)

Sheila Block

Tory Tory Deslauriers & Binnington

FILING DATE 23.12.1997

JANUARY 16, 1998 / LE 16 JANVIER 1998

                                                  CORAM:  Chief Justice Lamer and Cory and McLachlin JJ. /

Le juge en chef Lamer et les juges Cory et McLachlin

                                                                                            City of Surrey

                                                                                                v. (26266)

                                                                                      McIntosh Estates Ltd.

Valsol Management Ltd.

 Cresta Management Ltd. (B.C.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Procedural law - Evidence - Solicitor-client privilege - Production of documents - Whether the British Columbia Court of Appeal erred in ordering the production of documents which were subject to solicitor-client privilege.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                               The British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union

                                                                                                v. (26274)

                                            The Government of the province of British Columbia as represented

by the Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Civil rights - Labour law - Discrimination on the basis of sex - Adverse effect discrimination - Reverse/adverse effect discrimination - Mandatory fitness test for forest fire-fighters - Whether the setting of the standard for an aerobic fitness test for all initial attack forest fire fighting crew candidates resulted in discrimination against women, given the physiological differences between women and men - Whether the employer had accommodated the employee by taking reasonable measures short of undue hardship - Whether individualized testing can always relieve against a finding of adverse effect discrimination - Whether setting a lower aerobic fitness performance standard for females would result in reverse adverse effect discrimination against males.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                                       Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

                                                                                                v. (26181)

                                                                    Sovereign Life Insurance Company (B.C.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Commercial law - Banks/banking operations - Contracts - Consideration - Forbearance - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its analysis of the doctrine of consideration - The application of the doctrine of consideration to modifications of existing contracts - Interpretation of priority agreements.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

August 12, 1994

Supreme Court of British Columbia

(Master Patterson)

Order: Applicant may recover Scale 2 costs for this proceeding only; Applicant can not add administration fees to amount required to redeem

                                 M & D Farm Limited, Marcel Robert Desrochers and Darlene Erma Desrochers

                                                                                                v. (26215)

                                                         The Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corporation (Man.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Property law - Mortgages - Remedies - Foreclosure - Farm Debt Review Act, R.S. 1985, c.25 (2nd Supp.) - Loan from Respondent to Applicants secured by mortgage against farmlands owned by Applicants - Applicants defaulting on mortgage - Applicants obtaining a stay of proceedings pursuant to Farm Debt Review Act - Respondent subsequently obtaining order pursuant to Family Farm Protection Act, C.C.S.M., c. 15 for leave to commence proceedings under mortgage - Upon exhaustion of stay, Respondent becoming registered owner of farmlands - Court ruling that leave order and subsequent proceedings a nullity - Farmlands revested in Applicants - Court of Appeal reversing the order and revesting lands in Respondent - Statutes - Interpretation - Legal effect of stay issued under s. 23 of the Farm Debt Review Act - Whether stays issued pursuant to Farm Debt Review Act are truly effective to prevent the commencement and continuation of collateral proceedings against Canadian farmers.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                    The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada

                                                                                                v. (26260)

                                                             The Attorney General of British Columbia (B.C.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Crown - Whether the Government of the Province of British Columbia has the power under common law to implement and operate the reference-based pricing policy under the Pharmacare program without enacting legislation in support of that policy.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Charles Kieling, Barry Hildebrandt, Henry Hildebrandt, Dennis Wieler, Ron Wieler and Fred Kieling

                                                                                                v. (26386)

                                              Canadian Pacific Ltd. and Canadian National Railways Ltd. (Sask.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Procedural law - Actions - Civil Procedure - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing the Applicants’ statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

June 25, 1997

Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan (McLellan J.)

Respondents’ motion to dismiss the Applicants’ statement of claim granted

CORAM: L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ. /

Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

                                                                                                Paul Kelly

                                                                                                c. (26240)

                                                                           Sa Majesté la Reine (Crim.)(Qué.)

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Droit criminel - Détermination de la peine - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle commis une erreur en considérant que la disposition sur la base de laquelle la poursuite est instituée n’est pas déterminante dans l’imposition de la peine? - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle commis une erreur en ne concluant pas que le juge de première instance a erré dans l’application des principes de détermination de la peine?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

                                                                                       Sa Majesté la Reine

                                                                                                c. (26226)

                                                                              Benoît Grégoire (Crim.)(Qué.)

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Droit criminel - Preuve - Législation - Interprétation - Usage d’une déclaration protégée - La Cour d’appel du Québec a-t-elle erré en droit en décidant à l’unanimité que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur de droit en interprétant l’alinéa 672.21 (3)  f) du Code criminel  lui permettant d’utiliser contre l’intimé sa “déclaration protégée”?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

                                                                                    Her Majesty the Queen

                                                                                                v. (26254)

                                                                           Jody Keith Druken (Crim.)(Nfld.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Criminal law - Jurisdiction - Appeal - Whether there is a right of appeal to the court of appeal from a pre-trial application involving conflict of interest in a criminal trial.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                                      Les Immeubles Gaston et Réjeanne inc.

                                                                                                c. (26172)

La Caisse populaire de Notre-Dame de Mont-Carmel (Qué.)

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Procédure - Procédure civile - Appel - Droit des biens - Hypothèques - Exercice de droits hypothécaires - Cour supérieure accueillant en partie la requête en délaissement forcé présentée par l’intimée et déclarant que la demanderesse est en défaut d’exécuter les obligations découlant de l’acte de prêt hypothécaire - Pourvoi de la demanderesse à l’encontre de cette décision rejeté par la Cour d’appel au motif qu’il n’a aucune chance de succès et qu’il est dilatoire - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle erré en accueillant la requête en rejet d’appel de l’intimée? - La demanderesse peut-elle agir devant cette Cour sans être représentée par avocat?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

                                      Les Immeubles Gaston et Réjeanne inc. et Électricité Gaston St-Pierre inc.

                                                                                                c. (26173)

                                                       Caisse populaire de Notre-Dame de Mont-Carmel (Qué.)

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Procédure - Procédure civile - Appel - Droit des biens - Hypothèques - Exercice de droits hypothécaires - Cour supérieure accueillant en partie la requête en délaissement forcé présentée par l’intimée et déclarant que les demanderesses sont en défaut d’exécuter les obligations découlant de l’acte de prêt hypothécaire - Pourvoi des demanderesses à l’encontre de cette décision rejeté par la Cour d’appel au motif qu’il n’a aucune chance de succès et qu’il est dilatoire - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle erré en accueillant la requête en rejet d’appel de l’intimée? - Les demanderesses peuvent-elles agir devant cette Cour sans être représentées par avocat?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

                                                                                    Balbinder Singh Athwal

                                                                                                v. (26294)

                                                           The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (B.C.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Statutes - Interpretation - Section 70(5) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-2 - Whether an adjudicator must render a finding that an appellant was convicted of an offence for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed before subsection 70(5)(c) operates to remove an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

CORAM:   Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ. /

Les juges Iacobucci, Major et Bastarache

                                                                                      Denis Lucien Lepage

                                                                                                v. (26320)

                                                                       Her Majesty The Queen (Crim.)(Ont.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Criminal law - Insanity - Not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder - Whether s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code  infringes the s. 15 Charter rights of a person found not criminally responsible.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                               The Corporation of the Town of Wasaga Beach

                                                                                                v. (26102)

                                                                         Murray M. Sinclair, David McBride,

                                                              Barry Arthur Browning and Sidney McMurray,

                                                                            Executors of the Estate of the late

                                                           Terrence E. O’Neill, and Barry A. Browning (Ont.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Municipal law - Taxation - Municipal Tax Sales Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 48 - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that there was a failure to substantially comply with the procedure under the Act for a tax sale - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in allowing a claim for damages.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                          Manohar Singh Bal, Dwarka Doobay, Albert Dreise,

                                Phillip Friesen, Sajjad Hanif, Marian Heinen Kits, Marvin MacDonald,

 Zeyad Sakaa, Deokaran Sharma, Darshan Singh

                                                                                                v. (26116)

                                         The Attorney General for Ontario and The Minister of Education (Ont.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  - Civil Rights - Freedom of Religion - Equality Rights - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the decision in Adler et al. v. The Queen in Right of Ontario et al., [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to consider the application of s. 15 , s. 2(a)  and (b) of the Charter  to Policy Memorandum No . 112 and ss.  28 and 29 of the Regulations passed pursuant to the Ontario Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                                                Halifax Insurance Company

                                                                                                v. (26263)

                                                            Kyra McMahon, Gore Mutual Insurance Company,

                                                                   Angela Gontier and Deborah Butler (Ont.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Commercial law - Insurance - Motor vehicle - Damages - Excess coverage - Discrepancy between wording of application for insurance and insurance contract - Passenger in motor vehicle severely injured in motor vehicle driven by owner’s room-mate - Passenger’s claim for damages exceeding limit of liability on owner’s policy - Driver’s policy purporting to insure driver while operating motor vehicles owned by other people provided that those other people “do not reside in the same dwelling residence” as the driver - Application for insurance referred to vehicles owned by other persons in the same “household” - Whether owner and driver were residing in the same dwelling premises at the time of the accident within the meaning of the exclusion clause in the insurance contract - Whether motor vehicle owned by a room-mate is excluded from definition of “automobile” - Whether there is conflict between wording of the application for insurance and the insurance contract - Whether policy issued by insurer was in accordance with application of insurance within meaning of section 205(1) of the Insurance Act and if so, whether  insurer was obligated to advise insured driver of the difference.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                  The Investigation Team of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries

                                                                      and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries

                                                                                                v. (26290)

                                                                             Michael H. Kaplan, FCIA (Alta.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Administrative law - Judicial review - Law of professions - Evidence  - Remedies - Whether the chambers judge appropriately applied the applicable standard of review - Whether the chambers judge erred in requiring formal proof of the existence and validity of the Bylaws, rules and regulations of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries before its discipline tribunals - Whether the chambers judge erred in imposing a standard of wording for charges laid against members of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries in discipline proceedings which is higher than that applied in criminal proceedings - Whether the chambers judge erred in considering, in judicial review proceedings, arguments not raised in first instance in a consensual discipline process - Whether the chambers judge erred in not referring the matter back to a discipline tribunal of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                                                Muscillo Transport Limited

                                                                                                v. (26295)

                                                        Bank of Nova Scotia, Tom Higgs and Colin Cook (Ont.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

Commercial law - Mechanics’ liens - Trust provisions pursuant to section 8 of the Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C-30 - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing the cross-motion - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the decision of Slack Transport Ltd. v. General Concrete Ltd. (1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 137 (H.C.J.), (1983), 46 O.R. (2d) 255 (C.A.), [1983] 1 S.C.R. xiii, leave to appeal denied, was binding.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -- REHEARING

DEMANDE DE RÉEXAMEN -- NOUVELLE AUDITION

CORAM:   Chief Justice Lamer and Gonthier and Major JJ. /

Le juge en chef Lamer et les juges Gonthier et Major

John Dykun v. James H. Odishaw (Alta.)(26113)

CORAM: L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. /

Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory et Iacobucci

Vicky Karpeta v. CIRC Radio Inc. (Ont.)(25985)

JANUARY 22, 1998 / LE 22 JANVIER 1998

26250               YOKE WAH JONASSON, ALSO KNOWN AS EVA JONASSON - v. - WILLIAM BRIAN JONASSON (B.C.)

CORAM:           The Chief Justice and Cory and McLachlin JJ.

The application for extension of time is granted and the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

La demande de prorogation de délai est accordée et la demande d'autorisation d'appel est rejetée avec dépens.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Family law - Maintenance - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the principles of child or spousal support under the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp .) - Whether the Court of Appeal for the province of British Columbia erred in not applying the federal child support guidelines of May 1, 1979 - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in not compensating the Applicant and the children of the parties for disadvantage arising from the Respondent’s non-access to the children - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding the separation agreement valid - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the trial judge’s discretionary award of costs.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

May  1, 1997

Supreme Court of British Columbia (Errico J.)

Application for compensatory spousal maintenance and child support dismissed

June 12, 1995

Supreme Court of British Columbia (Errico J.)

Supplemental reasons for judgment: the Applicant to pay nine-fourteenths of the Respondent’s costs including disbursements

July 18, 1997

Court of Appeal for British Columbia

(Esson, Hollinrake and Ryan JJ.A.)

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed

26268               LOUIS BLANCHARD c. SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE  (Crim.)(Qué.)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

La demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée.

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Droit criminel - Preuve - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle erré en décidant que le Juge de première instance n’a pas l’obligation de corriger les remarques inflammatoires du procureur de la Couronne qui a invité le jury à mettre en question la crédibilité et l’honnêteté même du procureur du demandeur? - La Cour d’appel a-t-elle erré en décidant que le ministère public pouvait rehausser la crédibilité de son propre témoin en établissant les raisons l’ayant motivé à faire une déclaration à la police?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

Le 5 octobre 1992

Cour supérieure du Québec (Piché j.c.s.)

Déclaration de culpabilité:  Meurtre au premier degré, contrevenant l’article 235  du Code criminel 

Le 27 août 1997

Cour d’appel du Québec (Beauregard et Otis jj.c.a. et Zerbisias j.c.a. [ad hoc])

Appel rejeté

Le 27 octobre 1997

Cour suprême du Canada

Demande d’autorisation d’appel déposée

26270               RENÉ POMERLEAU c. ANDRÉ VERGE  (Qué.)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

La demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée avec dépens.

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Droit du travail - Pensions - Législation - Interprétation - Régime de retraite - Surplus accumulé - Arbitrage - Compétence - Droit transitoire - Intérêt quant au partage de l’excédent d’actif du Régime du mis en cause, la Société Asbestos Limitée - L’art. 310.1 de la Loi sur les régimes complémentaires de retraite, L.R.Q., ch. R-15.1, s’applique-t-il rétroactivement au Régime qui est totalement terminé depuis le 30 juin 1986 et qui continue à être gouverné par la  Loi sur les régimes supplémentaires de rentes, L.R.Q., ch. R-17, en tant qu’affaire pendante le 31 décembre 1989 devant la Régie des rentes? - L’équité au sens de l’article 243.14 de la  Loi sur les régimes complémentaires de retraite peut-elle servir de fondement pour empiéter sur le droit en général et contredire les définitions législatives sur la notion de participant susceptible de recevoir une part du surplus? - Les erreurs commises par l’arbitre ont-elles été commises dans l’exercice de sa compétence stricto sensu ou portent-elle plutôt sur des questions délimitant sa compétence?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

26072               MARCEL PARISÉ c. SOUS-MINISTRE DU REVENU DU QUÉBEC  (Qué.)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

La demande de prorogation de délai est accordée et la demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée avec dépens.

The motion for extension of time is granted and the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

NATURE DE LA CAUSE

Droit fiscal - Charte canadienne des droits et libertés  - Divulgation de la preuve - Déclaration de culpabilité prononcée contre le demandeur en raison de déclarations fausses ou trompeuses dans ses déclarations de revenus pour les années 1988, 1989 et 1990 - Requête du demandeur pour permission d’appel à la Cour d’appel rejetée - Le juge de première instance a-t-il erré en droit en permettant à la poursuite de déposer de nouveaux éléments de preuve lors de l’interrogatoire du demandeur, sans que la défense ait pu prendre connaissance de ces nouveaux éléments de la preuve avant le procès? - Le juge de première instance a-t-il interprété la preuve de façon manifestement déraisonnable en considérant que le demandeur a effectué des achats non-déclarés, par l’entremise de Placement 3M, pour une valeur de 211 408,75$ alors que la poursuite n’a établi qu’à 166 000 $ la valeur des achats?

HISTORIQUE PROCÉDURAL

26023               YVON DESCÔTEAUX c. BARREAU DU QUÉBEC (Qué.)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

La demande de réexamen de la demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée avec dépens.

The application for reconsideration of the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

26024               YVON DESCÔTEAUX c. BARREAU DU QUÉBEC  (Qué.)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier et Bastarache

La demande de réexamen de la demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée avec dépens.

The application for reconsideration of the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

Révisé le 19 janvier 1998                                                                                                                           Revised January 19, 1998

Le 8 janvier 1998                                                                                                               January 8, 1998

TITUS NGUIAGAIN c. LE FONDS POUR LA FORMATION DES CHERCHEURS ET L’AIDE À LA RECHERCHE et LA COMMISSION DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE ET Me JEAN-PAUL ROBERGE - et entre- TITUS NGUIAGAIN c. LE FONDS POUR LA FORMATION DES CHERCHEURS ET L’AIDE À LA RECHERCHE et BUREAU DU COMMISSAIRE GÉNÉRAL DU TRAVAIL, Me ROBERT LEVAC ET F.P.P.U.-C.E.Q. (Qué.)(25796)

CORAM:           Les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory et Iacobucci

La demande de réexamen de la demande d’autorisation d’appel est rejetée avec dépens.

The motion for reconsideration of the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

13.1.1998

Before / Devant:   L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ J.

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Santo Mazzeo

    v. (26387)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of Ontario (Ont.)

Requête en prorogation du délai pour obtenir l’autorisation d’appel

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to February 15, 1998.

13.1.1998

Before / Devant:   THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the appellant’s factum & record

Mavis Baker

    v. (25823)

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Ont.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire et le dossier de l’appelant

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE    

13.1.1998

Before / Devant: THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the respondent’s factum

Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women

    v. (25359)

Minister of National Revenue (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire de l’intimé

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to January 14, 1998.

13.1.1998

Before / Devant:   THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the appellant’s factum

Baj Singh Nijjar

    v. (25987)

Her Majesty The Queen (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire de l’appelant

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to September 18, 1997.

14.1.1998

Before / Devant:   MAJOR J.

Motion to state a constitutional question

Mavis Baker

   v. (25823)

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Ont.)

Requête pour énoncer une question constitutionnelle

DISMISSED / REJETÉE

14.1.1998

Before / Devant: L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ J.

Motion to strike out parts of the appellant’s factum

Ryan Robert Reed

    v. (25820)

Her Majesty The Queen (B.C.)

Requête en radiation de passages du mémoire de l’appelant

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE

14.1.1998

Before / Devant:   CHIEF JUSTICE LAMER

Motion to adjourn the hearing of the appeal

Damon Gregory Horne

   v. (25240)

Her Majesty The Queen (Alta.)

Requête pour ajourner l'audition de l'appel

DISMISSED / REJETÉE

14.1.1998

Before / Devant: THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the respondents’ factum

Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point

    v. (25795)

Attorney General of Canada et al. (Ont.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire des intimés

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to December 22, 1997.

15.1.1998

Before / Devant:   THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the respondent’s factum

Vancouver Society of Immigrant & Visible Minority Women

    v. (25359)

M.N.R. (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire de l’intimé

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE    Time extended to January 21, 1998.

15.1.1998

Before / Devant:   THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the appellant’s factum and record

Sean Michael Gellvear

    v. (25973)

Her Majesty The Queen (Alta.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour dépoesr le mémoire et le dossier de l’appelant

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE    Time extended to March 2, 1998, for the appellant to serve and file his factum, on condition that this appeal is ready to be heard during the April Term.

15.1.1998

Before / Devant: L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ J.

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Werner Naef et al.

    v. (26389)

McLean Brothers Fisheries Inc. et al. (Ont.)

Requête en prorogation du délai pour obtenir l’autorisation d’appel

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE    Time extended to February 20, 1998.

15.1.1998

Before / Devant:   LE JUGE L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ

Requête en prorogation du délai pour obtenir l’autorisation d’appel

Jean Claude Poulin et al.

    c. (26407)

M^e Jean Guy Gilbert et al. (Qué.)

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Avec le consentement des parties.

ACCORDÉE / GRANTED   Délai prorogé au 3 février 1998.

15.1.1998

Before / Devant:   L’HEUREUX-DUBÉ J.

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Kelly Dow

    v. (26359)

The United States of America (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour demander l’autorisation d’appel

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Upon review of the documents, the motion is allowed in part and the time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is extended to March 1, 1998.

16.1.1998

Before / Devant:   BASTARACHE J.

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Minister of Forests et al.

    v. (26394)

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. et al. (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai pour obtenir l’autorisation d’appel

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to January 7, 1998.

19.1.1998

Before / Devant:   LE REGISTRAIRE

Audience sur autre requête pour obtenir l’autorisation de produire une réplique à la réponse de l’intervenante

2903113 Canada Inc.

    c. (26256)

La Régie des Marchés agricoles et alimentaires (Qué.)

Hearing of miscellaneous motion by the applicant for leave to file a reply to the response of the intervener

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE 

19.1.1998

Before / Devant: GONTHIER J.

Motion to extend the time in which to apply for leave to appeal

Marcel Couture

    v. (26419)

Daniel Lamontagne (Sask.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour demander l’autorisation d’appel

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to January 15, 1998.

19.1.1998

Before / Devant: THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the appellant’s factum in reply to the cross-appeal

Her Majesty The Queen

    v. (25705)

N.G.H. (B.C.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer le mémoire de l’appelante en réplique à l’appel incident

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE    Time extended to January 16, 1998.

21.1.1998

Before / Devant: LE JUGE GONTHIER

Requête visant à produire de nouveaux éléments de preuve

Edwin Pearson

   c. (24107)

Procureur général du Canada (Qué.)

Motion to adduce new evidence

REFERRED / RÉFÉRÉE

La requête pour production de preuve additionnelle soit référée à la Cour saisie de l’audition sur le fond du pourvoi.

Dans l’intérim que les volumes 1, 2, 10, 11 et 12 du dossier conjoint produit en Cour d’appel du Québec dans le dossier no. 500-10-000297-943 soient ajoutés au dossier déjà produit en Cour suprême du Canada par la Cour d’appel du Québec dans la présente affaire.

21.1.1998

Before / Devant: THE REGISTRAR

Motion to extend the time in which to file the respondent’s response

Her Majesty The Queen

    v. (26329)

Linus Francis Walsh (Nfld.)

Requête en prorogation du délai imparti pour déposer la réponse de l’intimé

With the consent of the parties.

GRANTED / ACCORDÉE   Time extended to February 12, 1998.

13.1.1998

Sharon Marie Bracklow

   v. (26178)

Frank Patrick Bracklow (B.C.)

10.1.1998

Greif Containers Ltd.

     v. (26065)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of Canada (Ont.)

12.1.1998

Her Majesty The Queen in right of Canada et al.

    v. (26174)

Angelo Del Zotto et al. (F.C.A.)

REHEARING OF THE APPEAL -- NOUVELLE AUDITION DE L’APPEL

19.1.1998

CORAM:               Chief Justice Lamer and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.

Reference regarding the remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.)(24508)

    and between

Reference regarding the Independence and Impartiality of Judges of Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.)(24778)

    and between

Her Majesty The Queen

    v. (24831)

Shawn Carl Campbell et al. (Alta.)

    and between

The Judges of the Provincial Court of Manitoba as represented by the Manitoba Provincial Judges Association et al.

    v. (24846)

Her Majesty The Queen in right of the Province of Manitoba as represented by Rosemary Vodrey et al. (Man.)

Richard F. Taylor, for the appellant the A.G. of Alberta.

Gordon L. Campbell and Tracey Clements, for the respondent the A.G. of P.E.I.

E.W. Olson, Q.C., for the respondents Her Majesty The Queen in right of Manitoba et al.

John A. Legge, for the respondents Campbell, Ekmecic & Wickman.

Peter C. Ghiz, for the appellants Reference regarding Remuneration, Independence and Impartiality of Judges, P.E.I.

Robb Tonn and Colin S. Robinson, for the appellants Judges of the Provincial Court of Manitoba.

L. Yves Fortier, Q.C. and Leigh D. Crestohl, for the intervener the Canadian Judges Conference.

Robb Tonn and Colin S. Robinson, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges.

D.O. Sabey, Q.C. and Scott H.D. Bower, for the intervener the Alberta Provincial Judges Association.

Raynold Langlois, c.r., pour l’intervenante la Conférence des juges du Québec.

Edward R. Sojonky, Q.C. and Jon Brongers, for the intervener the A.G. of Canada.

RESERVED / EN DÉLIBÉRÉ

Nature of the case:

Constitutional law - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  - Courts - Judicial independence - Public Sector Pay Reduction Act - Whether the provisions of the Provincial Court Act accord with constitutional requirements of s. 11(d)  of the Charter  - Whether the enactment of the Public Sector Pay Reduction Act created additional problems in the independence and impartiality of the Provincial Court in addition to the difficulties in the Provincial Court Act.

Nature de la cause:

Droit constitutionnel - Charte canadienne des droits et libertés  - Tribunaux - Indépendance judiciaire - Public Sector Pay Reduction Act - Les dispositions de la Provincial Court Act sont-elles en accord avec les exigences constitutionnelles de l'al. 11d de la Charte ? - L'adoption de la Public Sector Pay Reduction Act a-t-elle ajouté des problèmes, relativement à l'indépendance et l'impartialité de la Cour provinciale, aux difficultés que comportait déjà la Provincial Court Act?

20.1.1998

CORAM:               Chief Justice Lamer and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Nancy Law

    v. (25374)

Minister of Human Resources Development (F.C.A.)(B.C.)

James Sayre (Via Vancouver), for the appellant.

Susan L. Van Der Hout, Virginia McRae and Julie Lalonde-Goldenberg, for the respondent.

RESERVED / EN DÉLIBÉRÉ

Nature of the case:

Canadian Charter  - Civil - Civil rights - Discrimination on the basis of age - Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in finding that sections 44(1)(d) and 58 of the Canada Pension Plan discriminate against widows and widowers under the age of 45 on grounds of age contrary to section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms - If the provisions are discriminatory, whether the provisions are justified as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society pursuant to section 1  of the Charter  - If the age distinctions violate the Charter , what remedy is appropriate?

Nature de la cause:

Charte canadienne  - Libertés publiques - Discrimination fondée sur l’âge - La Cour d’appel fédérale a-t-elle commis une erreur en concluant que les art. 44(1)d) et 58 du Régime de pensions du Canada créent de la discrimination contre les veufs et les veuves de moins de 45 ans contrairement à l’art. 15(1)  de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés ? - Si les dispositions sont discriminatoire, constituent-elles des limites raisonnables dont la justification peut se démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique en application de l’article premier de la Charte ? - Si la distinction fondée sur l’âge viole la Charte , quelle est la réparation appropriée?

20.1.1998

CORAM:               L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLahclin, Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Robert J. Dowling

    v. (25493)

City of Halifax (N.S.)

Eric K. Slone and Andrew J. Munro, for the appellant.

Mary Ellen Donovan and Joel E. Fichaud, Q.C., for the respondent.

ALLOWED WITH COSTS / ACCUEILLI AVEC DÉPENS

Nature of the case:

Labour law - Employment law - Master/Servant - Wrongful dismissal - Notice - Employer failing to discharge burden of proving just cause for dismissal - Employee’s improper conduct damaged the relationship of trust between employee and employer - Did the trial judge err in deciding that the principle of moderated damages applied to reduce the notice period - Whether the doctrine of “near cause” and “moderated damages”, as applied in this case, is good law. 

Nature de la cause:

Droit du travail    Droit de l'emploi    Employeur-employé    Renvoi injustifié    Préavis    L'employeur ne s'est pas acquitté de l'obligation de prouver un juste motif de renvoi    La conduite irrégulière de l'employé a porté atteinte au lien de confiance entre l'employé et l'employeur    Le juge du procès a‐t‐il commis une erreur en décidant que le principe des dommages atténués s'appliquait de façon à réduire la période de préavis?    La doctrine de la « cause prochaine » et des « dommages atténués » appliquée en l'espèce est-elle valable en droit?

21.1.1998

CORAM:               L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLahclin, Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Apotex Inc.

    v. (25348)

Eli Lilly and Company et al. (F.C.A.)(Ont.)

    and between

Apotex Inc.

   v. (25419)

Merck Frosst Canada Inc. et al. (F.C.A.)(Ont.)

   and between

Novopharm Ltd.

    v. (25402)

Eli Lilly and Company et al. (F.C.A.)(Ont.)

Harry B. Radomsky, Richard Naiberg and David Scrimger, for the appellant Apotex Inc.

Donald N. Plumley, Q.C. and Mark Mitchell, for the appellant Novopharm.

Anthony G. Creber, for the respondents Eli Lilly and Company et al. (response in 25348).

Robert P. Charlton, J. Nelson Landry and Judith Robinson, for the respondents Merck Frosst Canada Inc. et al. (response in 25419).

David Watson, Q.C., for the respondents Eli Lilly and Company et al. (response in 25402).

RESERVED / EN DÉLIBÉRÉ

Nature of the case:

Commercial law - Contracts - Sub-licence - Evidence -  Property law - Patents -Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the contract between Apotex and Novopharm, the construction of which was agreed to by the parties to the agreement but challenged by a stranger to the contract, when the

Nature de la cause:

Droit commercial - Contrats - Sous-licence - Preuve - Droit des biens - Brevets - La Cour d’appel fédérale a-t-elle mal interprété le contrat intervenu entre Apotex et Novopharm, dont l’interprétation avait été acceptée par les parties à l’accord mais contestée par un étranger au contrat, lorsque l’interprétation acceptée

construction agreed to by the parties was supportable on the plain meaning of the contract.

par les parties pouvait être justifiée suivant le sens clair du contrat?

22.1.1998

CORAM:               Chief Justice Lamer and Cory, Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Her Majesty The Queen

    v. (25886)

Joseph Clifford Poirier (Crim.)(P.E.I.)

Valerie A. Moore, for the appellant.

R. Scott Peacock, for the respondent.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE (orally for the Court):

The Court is ready to render judgment now.  Justice Cory will give the judgment of the Court.

CORY J.:

We agree with the conclusions reached by the majority of the Court of Appeal.

Mr. Justice Ghiz, the trial judge, took into account all the evidence presented and specifically stated that he had done so.  Based on that evidence, he concluded that he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.  He made no error of law in reaching this conclusion.

This Crown appeal as of right must therefore be dismissed.

[traduction]

LE JUGE EN CHEF (oralement au nom de la Cour):

La Cour est prête à rendre jugement séance tenante, lequel sera rendu par le juge Cory.

LE JUGE CORY:

Nous souscrivons aux conclusions de la Cour d’appel à la majorité.

Le juge Ghiz, juge du procès, a pris en considération toute la preuve produite et a précisé l’avoir fait.  Compte tenu de cette preuve, il a conclu qu’il n’était pas convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable de la culpabilité de l’accusé.  Il n’a commis aucune erreur de droit en tirant cette conclusion.

Le pourvoi de plein droit du ministère public doit donc être rejeté.

22.1.1998

CORAM:               Chief Justice Lamer and Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Stephen David Taylor

    v. (25857)

Her Majesty The Queen (Crim.)(B.C.)

Dennis T.R. Murray, Q.C., for the appellant. (Via Vancouver).

Robert A. Mulligan, for the respondent.  (Via Vancouver).

THE CHIEF JUSTICE (orally):

We will not need to hear from you, Mr. Mulligan.  We are ready to give our decision now.  Mr. Justice Bastarache will give the decision for the Court.

[traduction]

LE JUGE EN CHEF (oralement):

Il ne sera pas nécessaire de vous entendre, Me Mulligan.  Nous sommes prêts à rendre jugement séance tenante, lequel sera rendu par le juge Bastarache.

BASTARACHE J.:

We agree substantially with the reasons of Madam Justice Huddart in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  Accordingly, this appeal as of right is dismissed.

LE JUGE BASTARACHE:

Nous souscrivons, pour l’essentiel, aux motifs de Madame le juge  Huddart de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique.  En conséquence, le présent appel de plein droit est rejeté.

JANUARY 22, 1998 / LE 22 JANVIER 1998

24711                    PHILIPPE ADRIEN, EMILIA BERARDI, PAUL CREADOR, LORENZO ABEL VASQUEZ and LINDY WAGNER on their own behalf and on behalf of the other former employees of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Limited v. ZITTRER, SIBLIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., Trustees in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Limited, and MINISTRY OF LABOUR FOR THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS BRANCH (Ont.)

CORAM:               Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.

The appeal is allowed and paragraph 1 of the order of the Court of Appeal is set aside.  An order is substituted declaring that former employees of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Limited are entitled to make claims for termination pay (including vacation pay due thereon) and severance pay as unsecured creditors.  The costs in this Court are to be paid to the appellants by the Ministry of Labour on a party-and-party basis.  The orders of the courts below with respect to costs stand.

Le pourvoi est accueilli et le premier paragraphe de l’ordonnance de la Cour d’appel est annulé et remplacé par une ordonnance déclarant que les anciens employés de Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Limited ont le droit de présenter des demandes d’indemnité de licenciement (y compris la paie de vacances due) et d’indemnité de cessation d’emploi en tant que créanciers ordinaires.  Les dépens devant notre Cour doivent être payés aux appelants par le ministère du Travail sur la base des frais entre parties.  Les ordonnances des juridictions inférieures à l’égard des dépens ne sont pas modifiées.

25023                    TERENCE LAWRENCE CASLAKE - v. - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ONTARIO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NOVA SCOTIA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NEW BRUNSWICK, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ALBERTA (Crim.)(Man.)

CORAM:               The Chief Justice and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major and Bastarache JJ.

The appeal is dismissed.

Le pourvoi est rejeté.

Philippe Adrian, et al v. Zittrer, Siblin & Associates Inc., Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Ont.)(24711)

Indexed as:  Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) / Répertorié:  Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)

Judgment rendered January 22, 1998 / Jugement rendu le 22 janvier 1998

Present:  Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.

Employment law ‐‐ Bankruptcy ‐‐ Termination pay and severance available when employment terminated by the employer ‐‐ Whether bankruptcy can be said to be termination by the employer ‐‐ Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, s. 7(5), 40(1), (7), 40a ‐‐ Employment Standards Amendment Act, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 22, s. 2(3) -- Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B‐3  ‐‐ Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11, s. 10, 17.

A bankrupt firm’s employees lost their jobs when a receiving order was made with respect to the firm’s property.  All wages, salaries, commissions and vacation pay were paid to the date of the receiving order.  The province’s Ministry of Labour audited the firm’s records to determine if any outstanding termination or severance pay was owing to former employees under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and delivered a proof of claim to the Trustee.  The Trustee disallowed the claims on the ground that the bankruptcy of an employer does not constitute dismissal from employment and accordingly creates no entitlement to severance, termination or vacation pay under the ESA.  The Ministry successfully appealed to the Ontario Court (General Division) but the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned that court’s ruling and restored the Trustee’s decision.  The Ministry sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal judgment but discontinued its application.  Following the discontinuance of the appeal, the Trustee paid a dividend to Rizzo’s creditors, thereby leaving significantly less funds in the estate.  Subsequently, the appellants, five former employees of Rizzo, moved to set aside the discontinuance, add themselves as parties to the proceedings, and requested and were granted an order granting them leave to appeal.  At issue here is whether the termination of employment caused by the bankruptcy of an employer give rise to a claim provable in bankruptcy for termination pay and severance pay in accordance with the provisions of the ESA.

Held:  The appeal should be allowed.

At the heart of this conflict is an issue of statutory interpretation.  Although the plain language of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA suggests that termination pay and severance pay are payable only when the employer terminates the employment, statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone.  The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.  Moreover, s.10 of Ontario’s Interpretation Act provides that every Act “shall be deemed to be remedial” and directs that every Act shall “receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.”

The objects of the ESA and of the termination and severance pay provisions themselves are broadly premised upon the need to protect employees.  Finding ss. 40 and 40a to be inapplicable in bankruptcy situations is incompatible with both the object of the ESA and the termination and severance pay provisions.  The legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences and such a consequence would result if employees dismissed before the bankruptcy were to be entitled to these benefits while those dismissed after a bankruptcy would not be so entitled.  A distinction would be made between employees merely on the basis of the timing of their dismissal and such a result would arbitrarily deprive some of a means to cope with economic dislocation.

The use of legislative history as a tool for determining the intention of the legislature is an entirely appropriate exercise.  Section 2(3) of the Employment Standards Amendment Act, 1981 exempted from severance pay obligations employers who became bankrupt and lost control of their assets between the coming into force of the amendment and its receipt of royal assent.  Section 2(3) necessarily implies that the severance pay obligation does in fact extend to bankrupt employers.  If this were not the case, no readily apparent purpose would be served by this transitional provision.  Further, since the ESA is benefits-conferring legislation, it ought to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner.  Any doubt arising from difficulties of language should be resolved in favour of the claimant.

When the express words of ss. 40 and 40a are examined in their entire context, the words “terminated by the employer” must be interpreted to include termination resulting from the bankruptcy of the employer. The impetus behind the termination of employment has no bearing upon the ability of the dismissed employee to cope with the sudden economic dislocation caused by unemployment.  As all dismissed employees are equally in need of the protections provided by the ESA, any distinction between employees whose termination resulted from the bankruptcy of their employer and those who have been terminated for some other reason would be arbitrary and inequitable.  Such an interpretation would defeat the true meaning, intent and spirit of the ESA.  Termination as a result of an employer's bankruptcy therefore does give rise to an unsecured claim provable in bankruptcy pursuant to s.121 of the Bankruptcy Act for termination and severance pay in accordance with ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA.  It was not necessary to address the applicability of s. 7(5) of the ESA.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 385, 80 O.A.C. 201, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 9 C.C.E.L. (2d) 264, 95 C.L.L.C. ¶210‐020, [1995] O.J. No. 586 (QL), reversing a judgment of the Ontario Court (General Division) (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 441, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 246, 92 C.L.L.C. ¶14,013, ruling that the Ministry of Labour could prove claims on behalf of employees of the bankrupt.  Appeal allowed.

Steven M. Barrett and Kathleen Martin, for the appellants.

Raymond M. Slattery, for the respondent.

David Vickers, for the Ministry of Labour for the Province of Ontario, Employment Standards Branch.

Solicitors for the appellants:  Sack, Goldblatt, Mitchell, Toronto.

Solicitors for the respondent:  Minden, Gross, Grafstein & Greenstein, Toronto.

Solicitor for the Ministry of Labour for the Province of Ontario, Employment Standards Branch:  The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto.

Présents:  Les juges Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci et Major.

Employeur et employé ‐‐ Faillite ‐‐ Indemnités de licenciement et de cessation d’emploi payables en cas de licenciement par l’employeur ‐‐ Faillite peut-elle être assimilée au licenciement par l’employeur? ‐‐ Loi sur les normes d’emploi, L.R.O. 1980, ch. 137, art. 7(5), 40(1), (7), 40a ‐‐ Employment Standards Amendment Act, 1981, L.O. 1981, ch. 22, art. 2(3) -- Loi sur la faillite, L.R.C. (1985), ch. B‐3  ‐‐ Loi d’interprétation, L.R.O. 1990, ch. I.11, art. 10, 17.

Les employés d’une entreprise en faillite ont perdu leur emploi lorsqu’une ordonnance de séquestre a été rendue à l’égard des biens de l’entreprise.  Tous les salaires, les traitements, toutes les commissions et les paies de vacances ont été versés jusqu’à la date de l’ordonnance de séquestre.  Le ministère du Travail de la province a vérifié les dossiers de l’entreprise pour déterminer si des indemnités de licenciement ou de cessation d’emploi devaient encore être versées aux anciens employés en application de la Loi sur les normes d’emploi (la «LNE») et il a remis une preuve de réclamation au syndic.  Ce dernier a rejeté les réclamations pour le motif que la faillite d’un employeur ne constituant pas un congédiement, aucun droit à une indemnité de cessation d’emploi, à une indemnité de licenciement ni à une paie de vacances ne prenait naissance sous le régime de la LNE.  En appel, le ministère a eu gain de cause devant la Cour de l’Ontario (Division générale) mais la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a infirmé ce jugement et a rétabli la décision du syndic.  Le ministère a demandé l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel mais il s’est désisté.  Après l’abandon de l’appel, le syndic a versé un dividende aux créanciers de Rizzo, réduisant de façon considérable l’actif.  Par la suite, les appelants, cinq anciens employés de Rizzo, ont demandé et obtenu l’annulation du désistement, l’obtention de la qualité de parties à l’instance et une ordonnance leur accordant l’autorisation d’interjeter appel.  En l’espèce, il s’agit de savoir si la cessation d’emploi résultant de la faillite de l’employeur donne naissance à une réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite en vue d’obtenir une indemnité de licenciement et une indemnité de cessation d’emploi conformément aux dispositions de la LNE.

Arrêt:  Le pourvoi est accueilli.

Une question d’interprétation législative est au centre du présent litige.  Bien que le libellé clair des art. 40 et 40a de la LNE donne à penser que les indemnités de licenciement et de cessation d’emploi doivent être versées seulement lorsque l’employeur licencie l’employé, l’interprétation législative ne peut pas être fondée sur le seul libellé du texte de loi.  Il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’esprit de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur.  Au surplus, l’article 10 de la Loi d’interprétation ontarienne dispose que les lois «sont réputées apporter une solution de droit» et qu’elles doivent «s’interpréter de la manière la plus équitable et la plus large qui soit pour garantir la réalisation de leur objet selon leurs sens, intention et esprit véritables».

L’objet de la LNE et des dispositions relatives à l’indemnité de licenciement et à l’indemnité de cessation d’emploi elles-mêmes repose de manière générale sur la nécessité de protéger les employés.  Conclure que les art. 40 et 40a sont inapplicables en cas de faillite est incompatible tant avec l’objet de la LNE qu’avec les dispositions relatives aux indemnités de licenciement et de cessation d’emploi.  Le législateur ne peut avoir voulu des conséquences absurdes mais c’est le résultat auquel on arriverait si les employés congédiés avant la faillite avaient droit à ces avantages mais pas les employés congédiés après la faillite.  Une distinction serait établie entre les employés sur la seule base de la date de leur congédiement et un tel résultat les priverait arbitrairement de certains des moyens dont ils disposent pour faire face à un bouleversement économique.

Le recours à l’historique législatif pour déterminer l’intention du législateur est tout à fait approprié.  En vertu du par. 2(3) de l’Employment Standards Amendment Act, 1981, étaient exemptés de l’obligation de verser des indemnités de cessation d’emploi, les employeurs qui avaient fait faillite et avaient perdu la maîtrise de leurs biens entre le moment où les modifications sont entrées en vigueur et celui où elles ont reçu la sanction royale.  Le paragraphe 2(3) implique nécessairement que les employeurs en faillite sont assujettis à l’obligation de verser une indemnité de cessation d’emploi.  Si tel n’était pas le cas, cette disposition transitoire semblerait ne poursuivre aucune fin.  En outre, comme la LNE est une loi conférant des avantages, elle doit être interprétée de façon libérale et généreuse.  Tout doute découlant de l’ambiguïté des textes doit se résoudre en faveur du demandeur.

Lorsque les mots exprès employés aux art. 40 et 40a sont examinés dans leur contexte global, les termes «l’employeur licencie» doivent être interprétés de manière à inclure la cessation d’emploi résultant de la faillite de l’employeur.  Les raisons qui motivent la cessation d’emploi n’ont aucun rapport avec la capacité de l’employé congédié de faire face au bouleversement économique soudain causé par le chômage.  Comme tous les employés congédiés ont également besoin des protections prévues par la LNE, toute distinction établie entre les employés qui perdent leur emploi en raison de la faillite de leur employeur et ceux qui sont licenciés pour quelque autre raison serait arbitraire et inéquitable.  Une telle interprétation irait à l’encontre des sens, intention et esprit véritables de la LNE.  La cessation d’emploi résultant de la faillite de l’employeur donne effectivement naissance à une réclamation non garantie prouvable en matière de faillite au sens de l’art. 121 de la LF en vue d’obtenir une indemnité de licenciement et une indemnité de cessation d’emploi en conformité avec les art. 40 et 40a de la LNE.  Il était inutile d’examiner la question de l’applicabilité du par. 7(5) de la LNE.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 385, 80 O.A.C. 201, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 9 C.C.E.L. (2d) 264, 95 C.L.L.C. ¶210‐020, [1995] O.J. n^o 586 (QL), qui a infirmé un jugement de la Cour de l’Ontario (Division générale) (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 441, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 246, 92 C.L.L.C. ¶14,013, statuant que le ministère du Travail pouvait prouver des réclamations au nom des employés de l’entreprise en faillite.  Pourvoi accueilli.

Steven M. Barrett et Kathleen Martin, pour les  appelants.

Raymond M. Slattery, pour l’intimée.

David Vickers, pour le ministère du Travail de la province d’Ontario, Direction des normes d’emploi.

Procureurs des appelants:  Sack, Goldblatt, Mitchell, Toronto.

Procureurs de l’intimée:  Minden, Gross, Grafstein & Greenstein, Toronto.

Procureur du ministère du Travail de la province d’Ontario, Direction des normes d’emploi:  Le procureur général de l’Ontario, Toronto.

Terence Lawrence Caslake v. Her Majesty the Queen (Crim.)(Man.)(25023)

Indexed as:  R. v. Caslake / Répertorié:  R. c. Caslake

Judgment rendered January 22, 1998 / Jugement rendu le 22 janvier 1998

Present:  Lamer C.J. and L’Heureux‐Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major and Bastarache JJ.

Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights  -- Search and seizure -- Inventory search of accused’s car following lawful arrest -- Search conducted pursuant to police policy and without warrant or permission -- Whether search infringing Charter  right to freedom from unreasonable search or seizure -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8 .

Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights  -- Admissibility of evidence -- Evidence seized as result of inventory search of accused’s car following lawful arrest -- Search conducted pursuant to police policy and without warrant or permission -- Whether evidence found in search in violation of Charter  admissible -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 24(2) .

An R.C.M.P. officer, several hours after arresting the accused for possession of narcotics, conducted an inventory search of the accused’s impounded car pursuant to police policy and found cash and two individual packages of cocaine.  He did not have permission or a search warrant.  The accused unsuccessfully appealed his conviction of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking and of possession of cocaine.   At issue here was whether the search of the car was consistent with s. 8  of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  which guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, and if not consistent, whether the evidence should have been admitted.

Held:  The appeal should be dismissed.

Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: A search, to be reasonable under s. 8  of the Charter , must be authorized by law, the law itself must be reasonable, and the search must be carried out in a reasonable manner. Because a warrantless search has been held to be prima facie unreasonable, once the accused has demonstrated that the search was warrantless, the Crown has the burden of showing that the search was, on the balance of probabilities, reasonable.

Searches and seizures must be authorized by law and can fail to meet this requirement if any one of three conditions is not met.  First, the state authority conducting the search must be able to point to a specific statute or common law rule that authorizes the search.  Second, the search must be carried out in accordance with the procedural and substantive requirements the law provides.  Third, a search must not exceed its scope as to area and as to the items for which the law has granted the authority to search.

If the law on which the Crown is relying for authorization is the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest, then the limits of this doctrine must be respected. The most important of these limits is that the search must be truly incidental to the arrest:  the police must be able to explain, within the purposes recognized in the jurisprudence (protecting the police, protecting the evidence, discovering evidence) or by reference to some other valid purpose, why they conducted a search.  They do not need reasonable and probable grounds.  However, they must have subjectively had some reason related to the arrest for conducting the search at the time the search was carried out, and that reason must be objectively reasonable.  Delay and distance do not automatically preclude a search from being incidental to arrest, but they may cause the court to draw a negative inference.  That inference may be rebutted by a proper explanation.

A police search of the car for the purpose of finding evidence which could be used at the accused’s trial on the charge of possessing marijuana for purposes of trafficking would have been well within the scope of the search incident to arrest power, as there was clearly sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify a search.  However, the police cannot rely on the fact that, objectively, a legitimate purpose for the search existed when that is not the purpose for which they searched.  Agents of the state must act in accordance with the Rule of Law.  Hence, they must not only objectively search within the permissible scope but also turn their mind to this scope before searching, and satisfy themselves that there is a valid purpose for the search.  Here, the purpose of the search was to inventory the contents of the vehicle which falls outside the bounds of the legitimate purposes of search incident to arrest.

The delay in searching the vehicle was not, in and of itself, problematic.

The evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2)  of the Charter . First, the evidence was non‐conscriptive and would have no effect on the fairness of the trial.  Second, the breach was not serious.  The  inobtrusiveness of the search, the individual’s low expectation of privacy in the area searched, the existence of reasonable and probable grounds and the good faith of the police all pointed in favour of admitting the evidence.  Finally, excluding the evidence would have a more serious impact on the repute of the administration of justice than admitting it for the prosecution had no case without the evidence.

Per L’Heureux‐Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.: The search, given that the arrest was lawful, was incidental to the arrest because it was related, subordinated, to the arrest, rather than the arrest’s being incidental to the search.  The common law right to search incidentally to an arrest extends to an accused’s vehicle as part of the accused’s immediate surroundings. The question of delay was immaterial for the search to qualify as “incidental”.

Regardless of the police officer’s subjective belief in the purpose and justification for his inventory search, the officer had the right to search the vehicle pursuant to the common law power of search incidental to an arrest in the circumstances of this case.  This power draws its authority from the arrest itself.  It is not necessary to establish reasonable and probable grounds independently to conduct a search incidental to an arrest.  There was no onus on the Crown to establish at trial that the police officer was acting pursuant to a specific purpose recognized in the jurisprudence in order to establish that the search was truly incidental to the arrest.

The common law power to search incident to an arrest is not unreasonable and does not violate s. 8  of the Charter  if it is consistent, in the circumstances, with the proper administration of justice.  The issue must be whether the inventory search was truly incidental to the arrest and reasonably performed, and not whether the Charter  was infringed because the police officer could have obtained a warrant.  In the context of the surrounding circumstances, the search of the accused’s vehicle was reasonable.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal (1995), 107 Man. R. (2d) 24, 109 W.A.C. 24, 101 C.C.C. (3d) 240, 45 C.R. (4th) 98, [1995] M.J. No. 383 (QL), dismissing an appeal from conviction by Kennedy J.  Appeal dismissed.

John A. MacIver and Donald Neil MacIver, for the appellant.

David G. Frayer, Q.C., and Clyde R. Bond, for the respondent.

Michael Bernstein, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.

Maurice Galarneau and Gilles Laporte, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.

William D. Delaney, for the intervener the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.

Graham J. Sleeth, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General for New Brunswick.

Gregory J. Fitch, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.

Written submissions only by Jack Watson, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General for Alberta.

Solicitors for the appellant:  D. N. MacIver & Associates, Winnipeg

Solicitor for the respondent:  The Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario:  The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec:  The Attorney General of Quebec, Sainte‐Foy.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Nova Scotia:  The Attorney General of Nova Scotia, Halifax..

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General for New Brunswick:  The Attorney General for New Brunswick, Fredericton.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia:  The Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General for Alberta:  The Attorney General for Alberta, Edmonton.

Présents:  Le juge en chef Lamer et les juges L’Heureux‐Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major et Bastarache.

Droit constitutionnel ‐‐ Charte des droits -- Fouilles, perquisitions et saisies ‐‐ Fouille de l’automobile de l’accusé effectuée à des fins d’inventaire à la suite d’une arrestation légale ‐‐ Fouille effectuée conformément à une politique de la police et sans mandat de perquisition ni permission ‐‐ La fouille a‐t‐elle porté atteinte au droit à la protection contre les fouilles, perquisitions ou saisies abusives garanti par la Charte ? ‐‐ Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 8 .

Droit constitutionnel ‐‐ Charte des droits -- Admissibilité de la preuve ‐‐ Saisie d’éléments de preuve résultant d’une fouille de l’automobile de l’accusé effectuée à des fins d’inventaire à la suite d’une arrestation légale ‐‐ Fouille effectuée conformément à une politique de la police et sans mandat de perquisition ni permission ‐‐ Les éléments de preuve découverts lors de la fouille effectuée en violation de la Charte  sont‐ils admissibles? ‐‐ Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 24(2) .