Supreme Court Judgments

Supreme Court of Canada

Renaud v. Lamothe, (1902) 32 SCR 357

Date: 1902-05-15

JOHN LOUIS RENAUD (PLAINTIFF)

Appellant;

And

GUSTAVE LAMOTHE ET AL., ÊS QUALITE (DEFENDANTS)

Respondent.

1902: May 4; 1902: May 5; 1902: May 15

PRESENT:—Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Sedgewick, Girouard, Davies and Mills JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

Will—Condition of legacy—Religious liberty—Public policy—Restrictions as to marriage—Education—Exclusion from succession.

In the Province of Quebec the English law rules on the subject of testamentary dispositions, and, therefore, in that province, a testator may validly impose as a condition of a legacy to his children and grandchildren, that marriages of the children should be celebrated according to the rights of any church recognised by the laws of the province, and that the grandchildren should be educated according to the teachings of such church and may also exclude from benefit under his will any of his children marrying contrary to its provisions and grandchildren born of the forbidden marriages or who may not have been educated as directed.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, and dismissing the plaintiff's action with costs.

The action was taken by one of the grandchildren of the late Honourable Louis Renaud, deceased, against his testamentary executors for an account to the plaintiff as one of the residuary legatees of the deceased testator. By the will in question the testator left all his property to his widow in usufruct during her life, then to his children, as institutes under the substitution created by the will, and afterwards to his grandchildren as universal legatees. The plaintiff is a son

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of one of the children of the testator whose marriage subsequent to the execution of the will had not been celebrated according to the rights and usages of the Roman Catholic Church. The plaintiff was not baptised according to the rights of the Roman Catholic Church, nor brought up in that religion, and does not profess it.

A clause of a codicil to the will is as follows :—" Je veux et ordonne que tous les enfants nés on à naître de tous mariages que pourraient avoir contractés ou pourront contracter par la suite mes dits fils Louis, Zéphirin et Alfred Renaud contre ma volonté expresse ou qui n'auraient pas été contractés conformément aux lois et aux rites de la sainte-eglise catholique, apostolique et romaine, ou qui n'auraient pas été élvés et instruits dans cette religion, soient totalement exclus de ma succession et ne reçoivent aucune part dans le partage de mes biens la substituton créée par mon dit testament ne devant pas s'appliquer à eux. J'exclus également de ma succession et du bénéfice de Ia substitution faite en faveur de mes petis-enfants, tous enfants qui pourraient naître de tous mariages que pourraient contracter quelques-uns de mes autres enfants d'une manière clandestine et contrairement aux lois et rites de la sainte religion catholique, apostolique et romaine, ou qui ne seraient pas élevés dans cette bonne religion." In the Superior Court Mr. Justice H. T. Taschereau maintained the plaintiff's action and ordered the executors to account but this judgment was reversed by the Court of King's Bench by the judgment from which the present appeal is asserted.

Lafleur K.C. and White K.C. for the appellant. Art 760 C. C. limits the freedom of testamentary dispositions. An impossible condition, or one contrary to good morals, to law or to public order, in a will, is

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considered as not written. See Kimpton v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. ([1]).

The condition under discussion is in a two-fold sense, illegal and contrary to public order, for not only is it in restraint of marriage but it is in restraint of religious liberty and, to give effect to such a clause, would be a violation of the public policy of this country which allows the free exercise of choice in the matters of marriage and religion. By the Consolidaedd Statutes of Canada, chap. 74, sec. 1, the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference is, by the constitution and laws of the Province of Quebec, allowed to all Her Majesty's subjects therein. We refer to Saintespes-Lescot, des Donations entre Vifs, p. 212, nos. 137, 138; Coin-Delisle, Art. 900; 7 Aubry & Rau, no. 692 ; Meyer v. Pfister ([2]), Colmar, 9 Mars. 1827.

The statute 41 Geo. III., Chap. 4 (1801), subsequently reproduced in the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada Chap. 34 sec. 2, and later embodied in art. 831, of the Civil Code, introduced free disposal of property. Under the old law the testator could only bequeath a certain portion of his property ; a husband could receive nothing by will from his wife and vice versa. All these restrictions have been swept away and art. 831 of the Civil Code is the result. See also 5 Touillier, no. 264. This law is reproduced, word for word in art. 3439 R.S.Q., under Title XIX, intituled " Religious Matters." The question decided by the arrêt of Gellin v. Candy ([3]) is quite different from that of Meyer v. Pfister and from the present case. This case was decided two years before Meyer v. Pfister, and the contrary was decided by the same Court by arrêt of 11th Aug. 1847. See Troplong, 1 Traité des Donations, p.

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265. In addition to these arrêts, the Cour Royale de Corse by an arrêt on 2nd June 1828 in Rouaserra v. Rouaserra ([4]), held that the condition imposed in a will upon the legatee to marry a designated individual, must be considered not written, as contrary to the liberty of choice.

The English law has little or no bearing on this case but, on reference to 2 Jarman on Wills sec. 44 it will be seen that there is a distinction between devises of real estate and personal legacies, and that as regards the latter, conditions in restraint of marriage are void and that the rules of the civil law were in part adopted. In Jones v. Jones ([5]), it was stated by Blackburn, J., that there was a strong authority that, where the object of the will was to restrain marriage and to promote celibacy, the Court would hold such a condition to be contrary to public order and void.

The appellant submits that the clause in question should be read as a whole and one condition, and that the condition therein contained should be declared illegal and contrary to public order and as not written.

Belcourt, K.C., and Lamothe K.C., for the respondents. As the appellant was born before the death of the testator he was personally excluded by the will Troplong, 1 Traité des Donations nn. 190, 202, 208 ; 8 Duranton n. 97 ; Booth v. Meyer ([6]) ; Re Brown's Settlement ([7]). The validity of such a clause is admitted in the matter of an obligation, it should be equally admitted in the case of a will. All creeds are now on the same footing. They are equally free ; and stipulations in regard to them have become free and legal. In abolishing a state religion and in granting liberty of conscience, public authority has placed the matter in that category of things concerning which stipulation is permissible.

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All preferences have vanished ; the State, as a State is disinterested and the citizen enjoys, in this connection the same liberties and privileges that L he possesses in all matters, against which there exists no prohibitive law.

The French authorities have no application, and are misleading. The absolute freedom of disposing by will does not exist in France as it does in Canada. Nor does the decree of the Court of Colmar represent the unanimous opinion of the French courts. On 22nd Dec. 1825, the Royal Court of Grenoble gave a decision in an opposite sense in Gellin v. Candy ([8]). We also refer to Pandectes Françaises, vo. " Donations et Testaments," nos. 391 et seq.; 3 Massé et Verger, sur Zachariæ, p. 177, § 464; Troplong. Donations entre Vifs p. 274, No. 255 ; 18 Demolombe. No. 261 ; Ricard, Dispositions Conditionnelles, t, 11, p. 147, No. 155. As the laws of the French Revolution of 1791 should not and cannot have any effect in Quebec, it is necessary and proper to disregard the authorities that still admit expressly, or even by implication, the force of those laws.

The English Courts, have not adopted the rule of the civil law but have subjected it to various modifications. Hodgson v. Halford ([9]); Re Knox ([10]); Wain-wright v. Miller ([11]). The authorities distinguish between conditions that prevent a marriage, in an absolute manner, and conditions which merely tend to direct the course of the marriage. The first named conditions are contrary to public order ; the others are not, since they do not prevent the marriage. This decision has since been followed, see Theobald on Wills p. 453 ; Evans v. Rosser ([12]); Newton v.

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Marsden ([13]); Allen v Jackson ([14]) ; Sutton v. Jewks ([15]) ; Stackpole v. Beaumont ([16]). Conditions against marriage with a Scotchman, or in a manner not in accordance with the rules of the Quakers, or with a person of a particular religion, or a domestic servant, are valid. Perrin v. Lyon ([17]) ; Haughton v. Haughton ([18]) ; Duggan v. Kelly ([19]) ; Jenner v. Turner ([20]).

We rely also on Hamilton v. Plenderleath ([21]); Abbott v. Fraser ([22]); 25 Demolombo, No. 294 ; 4 Aubry & Rau, 302 ; 17 Laurnt n. 32.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by—

GIROUARD J.—Il s'agit de savoir si un père de

famille pent légalement apposer au legs qu'il fait à son fils la condition que son mariage sera célébré conformément aux rites d'une certaine église reconnue par la loi et que ses enfants seront élevés dans le sein de cette église. Il n'est aucunement question de changer de religion ; le fils ou le petit-fils peut le faire sans forfaire an legs ; seulement le père prend des mesures de précaution pour conserver sa foi chez ses descendants. Voici, d'ailleurs, Ia clause du testament en toutes lettres :

Troisièmement.—Je veux et ordonne que tous les enfants nés ou à naître de tous mariages que pourraient avoir contractés ou pourront contracter par la suite mes dits fils Louis, Zéphirin et Alfred Renaud contre ma volonté expresse ou qui n'auraient pas été contractés conformément aux lois et aux rites de la sainte église catholique apostolique et romaine, ou qui n'auraient pas éte élevés et instruits dans cette religion soient totalement exclus de ma succession et ne reçoivent vent aucune part dans le partage de mes biens, la substitution créée par mon dit testament ne devant pas s'appliquer à eux. J'exclus également de ma sucession et du bénéfice de la substitution faite en

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faveur de mes petits-enfants, tous enfants qui pourraient naître de tous mariages que pourraient contracter quelques-uns de mes autres enfants d'une manière clandestine et contrairement aux lois et rites de Ia sainte religion catholique apostolique et romaine, ou qui ne seraient pas élevés dans cette bonne religion.

Le premier point que nous avons à examiner est la position de l'église catholique romaine dans la province de Québec.

A l'époque de la cession de la colonie à la Grande-Bretagne, un pareil legs aurait été parfaitement valide, l'église catholique étant Ia seule religion reconnue au pays. Les capitulations de Québec et Montréal et le traité de cession n'ont pas ii est vrai, reconnu l'église catholique comme église de l'état, mais le libre exercice de cette église fut garanti, sans aucune restriction. Ces stipulations ont autant d'autorité que les statuts de l'empire et il n'est jamais venu à Ia pensée des légistes de les méconnaître Bien au contraire par l'acte de Québec, le droit à la dime, qui avait été réservé par la capitulation de Montréal, fut consacré ; et, par des lois subséquentes passées par la législature coloniale bien avant la confédération la construction des églises catholiques fut encouragée par la création d'un privilège comportant hypothèque sur les propriétés immobilières de ses membres. Ce droit n'a pas été aceordé aux autres églises, pas même à l'église d'Angleterre, qui n'a pas non plus le privilège de prélever la dîme, privilège qu'elle réclama au début, mais qui lui fut refusé par les autorités anglaises.

On peut affirmer que Si l'église catholique n'est pas la religion nationale de la grande majorité des habitants de la province de Québec, elle y est cependant établie par exception, et par les traités internationaux et par les lois de l'Empire Britannique (art. 4 du Traité de Paris, 1763; ss. 5 et 7 de l'acte de Québec 1774; sect. 35 de l'acte constitutionnel de 1791 et sect. 42 de l'acte d'union de 1840). Les statuts refondus du

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Canada, 1859, ch. 25 et 74—qui avaient surtout en vue les églises protestantes et l'église catholique du Haut-Canada,—n'ont rien d'incompatible avec cette position particulière de l'église catholique du Bas-Canada. Voir Brown v. Les Curé et Marguillers de Notre Dame de Montréal ([23]) et les documents sur les réserves du clergé publiés par le bureau des Archives du Canada 1899, pp. 1 à 41.

L'Appelant soutient qu'un legs, comme celui fait aux fils Renaud, favorisant indirectement l'église catholique romaine ou aucune autre religion, est nul, comme étant contraire à l'ordre public c'est-à-dire, à la liberté de conscience, et il cite l'article 831 du Code Civil et le chap. 74 des statuts refondus du Canada, 1859.

L'ordre public ou social—l'intérêt général—public policy—Voilà de grands mots, assez vagues, qui en droit doivent avoir cependant une signification définie. Que faut-il donc entendre par ces mots en matières civiles ? Le Code ne le dit pas. Ne faut-il pas comprendre que pour qu'un acte soit contraire à l'ordre public, qui est l'expression consacrée par le Code, il faut qu'il y ait au moins violation d'une loi d'intérêt public ? Or, il n'y a aucun texte de loi qui défende de semblables legs. Reste à examiner l'interprétation donnée par la jurisprudence.

Sera-ce toujours la jurisprudence française qui devra determiner notre ligne de conduite, même lorsque nous avons adopté le droit anglais sur, un sujet particulier ? Nous avons décidé récemment dans une cause de Glengoil Steamship Co. v. Pilkington, ([24]) que l'ordre public, en matières civiles, n'est pas toujours tel que compris en France, ancienne on nouvelle. Allons-nous décider que la capacité de donner et recevoir par testament, qui incontestablement est

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d'ordre public et nous vient du droit anglais, doit être interprétée par la jurisprudence française? Non, je ne puis accepter cette proposition, d'autant plus qu'il est de l'intérêt de la province de Québec et de ( toute Ia Puissance, que, sur un sujet comme celui que nous considérons, il y alt uniformité de jurisprudence. Singulier spectacle que serait celui où un legs, comme celui fait aux héritiers Renaud, serait valide dans toutes les provinces, à l'exception de Québec et ce pour raison d'ordre ou d'intérêt public. C'est ce que nous verrions cependant si le testateur eût laissé des immeubles situés dans Ontario par exemple. Il ne peut en être ainsi à moins que la loi ne le dise clairement.

On oppose la jurisprudence française. En effet, les commentateurs et les tribunaux de la France moderne sont divisés sur la question que nous avons à decider. Je doute que l'on ne puisse aceumuler autant d'autorites dans un sens comme dans l'autre. Supposons même qu'elles soient unanimes ; pour quelle raison devrions-nous les suivre dans l'espéce ? Il ne suffit pas qu'elles soient françaises, pour les recommander à notre jugement. Il faut voir d'abord si les lois, promulguées dans les deux pays sur la matière, sont à peu près identiques.

N'oublions pas que la révolution française changea bien des principes, particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'ordre public. Des principes nouveaux, que l'on est convenu d'appeler " les grands principes proclamés en 1789," sont venus changer l'ordre public, celui qui fut l'âme de notre jurisprudence. Une nouvelle liberté individuelle succéda à l'ancienne ; et pour n'en citer qu'un exemple qui nous intéresse le plus la faculté même de tester disparut. Il est vrai que ces principes furent plus tard en partie abandonnés ou considérablement modifiés. On ne

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peut nier cependant qu’ils ont laissé une profonde impression sur le peuple français, sur ses législateurs et ses jurisconsultes. A plus de soixante ans de distance l'article ler de la constitution de l'Empire de 1851 proclamait de nouveau les principes de 1789.

Placés dans cette position de confusion et d'incertitude, quel est notre devoir sur une question d'ordre public ? Lorsque le Code de Ia province de Québec est semblable au Code français, je comprends que la jurisprudence française doit être notre guide, an moins une haute autorité, qui a rarement été ignorée par cette cour, si jamais elle le fût, quelque différente qu'elle soit du droit anglais. (Voir Consumers Cordage Co. v. Connolly ([25]).

Mais si notre Code est différent s'il décrète un principe du droit anglais, n'est-il pas raisonnable de recourir à la jurisprudence anglaise pour l'interpréter ? Or,—et ceci n'est pas contesté,—la liberté pleine et entière de tester nous vient de l'Angleterre. La France ne l'a jamais connue. Peut-on alors mieux faire que de suivre les principes consacrés par le Conseil Privé dans une cause analogue, celle de Kins' v. Tunstall décidée en 1874, et rapportée aux Law Reports ([26]) Ici, il s'agissait non seulement d'un legs contre l'ordre public, mais contre les bonnes mœurs, telles que comprises dans le droit français, de riches seigneuries, dépassant en valeur la limite des aliments de l'ancien droit ayant été léguées à un enfant adultérin. Le jugement de la cour de première instance, rendu par un juge (Torrance J.) bien connu pour sa science en droit romain, se lit comme suit : ([27])

Considering that by law and the jurisprudence of the courts of this province, the testator Gabriel Christie had, since the passing by the

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Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, of the Act numbered chapter 83 of the Acts passed in the fourteenth year of the late reign of His late Majesty George III, capacity to dispose of his estate and property without reserve restriction or limitation.

Considering that from and after the passing of the Act of the late Province of Lower Canada, numbered chapter IV of the Acts passed in the forty-first year of the reign of His said Majesty a testator had a right to bequeath in favour of any person or persons whatsoever all and every his or her lands, goods, or credits without reserve, restriction, or limitation.

L'opinion du juge Badgley, siégeant en appel dans Ia même cause est remarquable ; elle est citée au long au rapport de la décision du Conseil Privé ([28]) :

Reading the proviso as the substitute for the article and considering its English origin, where entire freedom was observed in favour of devisees without distinction, the proviso could only have contemplated for this province the same enlarged power as was practised in England in such matters and demonstrated the intent by omitting the qualifying words of the article as to the devisee, leaving the devisor free to give to whomsoever he might think proper to receive his liberality, and necessarily giving to these capacity freely to receive without restraint. This proviso was the only change effected upon the old re-introduced law, and seemed to be intended to make testacy in Canada as extended and beneficial as in England.

It has been objected against the enlarging effect of the enactment to remove the previous incapacity of devisors to make such a bequest, that the previous law, the French law, was a law of public order and morality, and could not be set aside except by express terms, specifically innovating upon the terms of the old law. It is sufficient to say that it was not a law so known, it was merely a French jurisprudenee at any time, and, as shewn above, such bequests by parents were protected by the Parisian jurisprudence, up to and after April, 1663, when the law of the Custom was established here, at which time such bequest was not held to be against public order or morality as then known and practised in the Prévôté de Paris. It will likewise be borne in mind that the statutory provision originated in England where such freedom of devise prevailed, and where neither law nor public order or morality incapacitated bastards, without distinction, from receiving bequests without restriction from their parents ; and the same capacity exists in the common law in the United States ; see Kent, Com. vol. ii, p. 209, et seq; Redfield on Wills vol. i ; and by

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the decision of the Privy Council in Durocher's Case ([29]), it was held that the alleged incapacity of testator was removed by the Act of 1774. This Act was in force in the Province of Quebec in 1789, the date of the will and bequest in favour of the testator's natural son, William Plenderleath, and has not been repealed.

Both statutes being general in their terms for devisors and devisees, they can be controlled by no limitations or exceptions, unless specially declared.

It seems evident, therefore, that the alleged incapacity of, William Plenderleath Christie if it existed, had been removed by the effect of the general capacitating law existing in the province long anterior to 1835, the time of the opening of the substitution for his benefit, and enabled him to receive the bequest as any person whatsoever, and this is established by an undisturbed legislative and judicial concurrence, which may be resumed as follows :—First : Legislatively, by the statutory enactments of 1774 and 1801, condensed and combined in the 2nd section of chapter 34 of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada of 1861. afterwards continued and adopted in ipsissimis verbis into the Civil Code enacted and promulgated in 1866, and still in force the whole without limitation or restriction upon the devisor to give or the devisee to receive. Secondly : Judicially, by the judgment of the Provincial Court of Anneal, in Durocher v Beaubien (1), in 1826, composed of five judges, and confirmed by the judgment of the Privy Council in 1828, which has not since been disturbed ; again, by the judgment in Hamilton v. Christie in the King's Bench of 1839, composed of three judges and supported on the merits by the unanimous opinion of the Provincial Court of Appeal, in 1845, composed of four judges ; then by the opinion of the three judicial codifiers, as expressed in their report upon wills in January 1864, referred to above ; then again in this cause, by the considered judgment of the court below, composed of one judge, from whose judgment this appeal to this court has been taken ; and, finally, by this court, composed of five judges, four of whom are in concurrence, and the fifth, Mr. Justice Monk, dissented mainly upon the non-retroactivity of the Act of 1801, which, he admitted, removed disqualifications in devisees from that time. It would be difficult to present a more uniform and consistent legislative and judicial concurrence of interpretation in favour of the pretensions of the devisee litigated in this cause, and of his capacity to receive the bequest in his favour when his receiving power became legally effective.

Lord Justice James, parlant an nom du tribunal, observe, p. 90 :

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But beyond that, the law of England having from the earliest period, from the time when testamentary dispositions were introduced, given absolute power to a testator to deal as he liked with his property, wholly regardless of any moral or natural claims upon him, the English Legislature introduced that law into Lower Canada.

Puis référant à la loi canadienne de 1801 le tribunal ajoute :

In this state of things the Canadian Legislature, having before it the English law, passed an Act which professed to explain as well as to amend the English Act ; and it proceeds to recite that doubts and difficulties had arisen with respect to the construction of the English Act. These doubts and difficulties it was perfectly within the competency of the Canadian Legislature to deal with as they thought fit, being a mere matter of disposition of property in the colony, not affecting any imperial policy. They recite the difficulties, and then they go on to declare and enact that it shall be lawful for a testator to give to any person or persons whomsoever, with the single exception of gifts in mortmain.

Indeed it was said that such a principle is not to be applied to this case : that the attempt to make this gift is such a violation of law on the part of the testator that it is to be struck out just as if it were a gift poo turpi causâ or contra bonos mores.. Their Lordships are unable to take that view. Nobody surely can suppose that it is crime in a man to express by his will his wishes as to what should be the devolution of his property after his death, or that it should go in a particular direction,—even although that direction should be in favour of an adulterine bastard, leaving it open to the law to say whether the wish shall or shall not take effect. There is nothing immoral, nothing wrong in the expression of such a wish, nothing to prevent the ordinary application of the ordinary principles of law to the case. And, therefore, even if the old incapacity of adulterine bastardy had not been effectually removed by the English Act, it had, before the substitution opened, been removed by the intervening Canadian Legislation.

Voir aussi Abbott v. Fraser ([30]).

Ainsi sur une question même de bonnes mœurs en matières civiles, telle que comprise dans l'ancien droit français et même le nouveau, c'est le droit anglais qui doit nous régir. Il doit en être de même

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sur une question d'ordre public, qui est le seul motif que les avocats de l'appelant ont invoqué. A mon point de vue les statuts de 1774 et 1801, reproduits au Code Civil art. 831, 839, 872 et 899, ont complètement rangé la province de Québec dans le domaine du droit anglais, au sujet de la liberté de tester et de recevoir par testament. La jurisprudence de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis où la liberté de conscience est proclamée aussi pleinement et libéralement qu'en France au Canada ou ailleurs, est unanime à reconnaître la validité d'une condition comme celle qui est attachée au legs fait aux héritiers Renaud.

Pour ces raisons, nous sommes d'avis de confirmer le jugement dont est appel, avec dépens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: White, O'Halloran & Buchanan.

Solicitors for the respondents: Lamothe & Trudel.