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Sinclair v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 579

 

The Attorney General of Quebec                                                     Appellant

 

v.

 

Albert Sinclair, Cécile Turgeon,

Fernando Boutin, Yvon Lafrenière,

Richard Laszczewski and the Comité de

défense des droits démocratiques des

citoyens de Noranda    Respondents

 

and

 

The Attorney General of Canada,

the Attorney General of Manitoba

and Alliance Quebec, Alliance for

Language Communities in Quebec                                                   Interveners

 

and

 

City of Noranda, City of Rouyn,

Réal Bordeleau and Daniel Samson                                                 Mis en cause

 

Indexed as:  Sinclair v. Quebec (Attorney General)

 

File No.:  21762.

 

1991:  October 9; 1992:  February 27.

 

Present:  Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin and Stevenson JJ.

 

on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec

 

                   Constitutional law ‑‑ Language guarantees ‑‑ Instruments of legislative nature -- Quebec legislation amalgamating two cities ‑‑ Legislative process divided into a series of discrete steps ‑‑ Whether all instruments, from ministerial order postponing municipal elections to notification of the issuance of letters patent for new city, must comply with s. 133  of Constitution Act, 1867  ‑‑ An Act respecting the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, S.Q. 1985, c. 48.

 

                   The Act respecting the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, which was aimed at amalgamating the two cities under certain conditions, came into force in 1985.  The Minister of Municipal Affairs ordered the postponement of the election in Rouyn pursuant to s. 19 of the  Act and, when the two cities were unable to reach a draft agreement on the terms of the amalgamation, issued an order in lieu of the draft agreement pursuant to s. 4. The result of the referendum was in favour of the amalgamation and, as provided by s. 14, the Quebec government conferred letters patent on the new city.  The letters patent were published in the Gazette officielle du Québec and came into force that same day (s. 15). The Act was printed and published in French and English in conformity with s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867  but the order postponing the election in Rouyn, the order issued in lieu of a draft agreement, the order in council ordering the issuance of letters patent for the new city, the letters patent themselves and the notice of issuance of the letters patent were printed in French only. The last three instruments were also published in the Gazette officielle du Québec in French only. The respondents brought an action in the Superior Court for a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional. The trial judge dismissed the action but the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. At the hearing of this appeal, this Court rejected from the bench respondents' arguments based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms challenging the constitutionality of the Act:  [1991] 3 S.C.R. 134. The sole issue remaining in this appeal is whether all the instruments, from the ministerial order postponing the municipal elections to the notification of the issuance of the letters patent for the new city, were subject to the requirements of s. 133, which applies to statutes and all other instruments of a legislative nature.

 

                   Held:  The appeal should be dismissed. All the instruments were subject to the requirements of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 

 

                   The National Assembly of Quebec has attempted to divide the legislative process into a number of discrete steps, and then to claim that each of these individual steps, considered in isolation, lacks a legislative character. The requirements of s. 133 cannot be circumvented by the disingenuous division of the legislative process in this manner. If the net effect of a series of discrete acts has a legislative character, then each of these component acts will also be imbued with this same character. Here, all of the instruments challenged were part of a process which, when viewed in its entirety, was undoubtedly legislative.  Accordingly, all of them were subject to the requirements of s. 133. Since none of the instruments complied with that section, they are, and always have been, nullities and of no legal force and effect. One cannot ignore, however, that, de facto, a new city has been in existence since 1986, operating on the faith of purported letters patent establishing its constitution.  This is an appropriate case for this Court to exercise its suspensive power by declaring that the instruments in this appeal, while invalid for non‑compliance with s. 133, shall continue in force for a period of time in order to permit the National Assembly to take whatever steps it sees fit to remedy the constitutional defects.  This period of time shall be for one year from the date of this judgment.

 

Cases Cited

 

                   Referred toReference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 000; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Brunet, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 260.

 

Statutes and Regulations Cited

 

Act respecting the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, S.Q. 1985, c. 48, ss. 1, 4, 5, 14, 15, 19.

 

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .

 

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12.

 

Constitution Act, 1867 , s. 133 .

 

Regulations Act, R.S.Q., c. R-18.1, s. 1 "regulation".

 

                   APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, [1990] R.J.Q. 309, 28 Q.A.C. 86, 47 M.P.L.R. 275, setting aside a judgment of the Superior Court, [1986] R.J.Q. 2586.  Appeal dismissed.

 

                   Jean‑Yves Bernard, Louis Rochette and Marise Visocchi, for the appellant.

 

                   Guy Bertrand and Alain Joffe, for the respondents.

 

                   Martin Low, Q.C., and René LeBlanc, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

 

                   Donna J. Miller and Deborah Carlson, for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba.

 

                   Stephen A. Scott and Victoria Percival‑Hilton, for the intervener Alliance Quebec.

 

//The Court//

 

                   The following is the judgment delivered by

 

                   The Court --

 

The Facts

 

                   On May 14, 1985, M. Gilles Baril, the Member of the National Assembly for Rouyn-Noranda-Témiscamingue, introduced a bill to the National Assembly entitled An Act respecting the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, which, after amendment, received assent and came into force on June 20, 1985, S.Q. 1985, c. 48 ("Bill 190").  The purpose of Bill 190 was to provide for the amalgamation of the cities of Rouyn and Noranda into a new municipal corporation called Rouyn-Noranda.  This amalgamation, however, was not to come into effect until certain conditions were satisfied.  The relevant portions of Bill 190 read as follows:

 

                   1.  Subject to section 14 and from the date of coming into force of the letters patent contemplated in section 15, the inhabitants and ratepayers of the territories of the cities of Rouyn and Noranda are incorporated as a city under the name of city of Rouyn‑Noranda, which is governed by the Cities and Towns Act (R.S.Q., chapter C‑19).

 

                   4.  Subject to section 16, the cities of Rouyn and Noranda shall, before 1 November 1985, present to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, a draft agreement including the elements prescribed in paragraphs b, d, e, f, g, i and l of subsection 2 of section 5 of the Act to promote the regrouping of municipalities (R.S.Q., chapter R‑19).

 

                   Where the Minister considers it to be expedient, he may amend, by order, all or part of the content of the draft agreement.  The draft agreement amended by the Minister shall be in lieu of the draft agreement contemplated in the first paragraph.

 

                   Failing a draft agreement as contemplated in the first paragraph, the Minister shall determine, by order, the elements contemplated in the first paragraph.  The order shall be in lieu of the draft agreement contemplated in the first paragraph.

 

                   The order contemplated in the second or third paragraph shall be adopted before 21 January 1986.

 

                   5.  On 23 March 1986, the clerk of each city contemplated in section 4 shall, each in his own territory, hold a referendum for the interested persons on the advisability of amalgamating the two cities.

 

 

                   14.  Where the result of the poll is, in each city contemplated in section 4, in favour of the amalgamation, the Government shall order, before 1 May 1986, the issue of letters patent reproducing the content of the draft agreement contemplated in the first paragraph of section 4, as amended, where such is the case, under the second paragraph of that section or the content of the order made by the Minister pursuant to the third paragraph of that section.

 

                   15.  The Minister shall give notice of the issue of the letters patent by publishing them in the Gazette officielle du Québec; the letters patent shall come into force on the date of the publication or on any later date mentioned in the notice.

 

                   19.  The Minister of Municipal Affairs may postpone, for not more than eight months, the date of publication of a notice of any general election or by‑election to be held in a city contemplated in section 4.

 

                   According to s. 4 of Bill 190, hence, the cities of Rouyn and Noranda were given until November 1, 1985, to present to the Minister of Municipal Affairs "a draft agreement", essentially a document outlining the agreed terms and conditions of the amalgamation.  During the period of negotiations, the Minister was empowered to postpone municipal elections for up to eight months in either of the two cities:  s. 19.  The Minister was empowered to amend any draft agreement agreed upon, and, in the absence of an agreement, was empowered to issue an "order in lieu of the draft agreement", which would establish the terms of amalgamation.  These proposed terms of amalgamation, either as agreed upon or as determined by the order, were then to be put to a referendum in the two cities on March 23, 1986.  In this referendum, natural and non-natural persons (i.e. corporations) were entitled to vote.

 

                   Under s. 14 of Bill 190, in the event of a favourable referendum result in both cities, "the Government shall order, before 1 May 1986, the issue of letters patent reproducing the content of the draft agreement ... or the content of the order made by the Minister".  Under s. 15, "[t]he Minister shall give notice of the issue of the letters patent by publishing them in the Gazette officielle du Québec".  The letters patent were to come into force upon publication: s. 15.  Bill 190, in conformity with s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 , was passed and published in the French and English languages.

 

                   In the context of this statutory framework, the following events unfolded:

 

                   On September 4, 1985, the Minister ordered the postponement of the municipal elections in Rouyn.  This order does not appear to have been officially published in any language.  By January 20, 1986, Rouyn and Noranda had not reached agreement on terms of amalgamation.  The Minister therefore issued an order in lieu of the draft agreement, as contemplated by s. 4 of Bill 190.  This does not appear to have been published in any language.  The order in lieu of the draft agreement was made in the French language only.

 

                   On February 27, 1986, the respondents, certain citizens of Noranda, brought an action in the Superior Court of Quebec for a declaration that Bill 190 was unconstitutional, and on March 17 added a request for an interlocutory injunction restraining the holding of the referendum.  The request for an injunction came on for hearing before Dufour J. on March 21, 1986, who postponed the hearing to a later date.

 

                   The referendum was held as planned on March 23, 1986, and the result was in favour of amalgamation, by an overwhelming majority in Rouyn, and marginally in Noranda.  On April 23, 1986, pursuant to s. 14 of Bill 190, the government of Quebec conferred letters patent on the new city of Rouyn-Noranda:  (1986) 118 G.O. II 1373.  The letters patent were published in the Gazette officielle du Québec on July 5, 1986, (1986) 118 G.O. I 3342, and pursuant to s. 15 of Bill 190, they came into force that day.  The order conferring the letters patent, the letters patents themselves, and the publication in the Gazette officielle du Québec, were solely in the French language.

 

                   On July 4, 1986, prior to the coming into force of the letters patent, Mignault J. dismissed the action for a declaratory judgment, for reasons handed down on July 31, 1986:  [1986] R.J.Q. 2586.  He first rejected the contention that Bill 190 was ultra vires the National Assembly on grounds of the procedure followed in its enactment.  He rejected as well the respondents' numerous assertions that Bill 190 and the referendum violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12.  Finally, he rejected the assertion that the order in lieu of the draft agreement issued by the Minister was invalid for want of compliance with s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .  The order, not having any legal force in its own right, could not be an instrument of a legislative character.  It is worthy of note, however, he would have found that the letters patent themselves were of a legislative character, but at the time of judgment they had not come into force.

 

                   The Quebec Court of Appeal, consisting of Bisson C.J.Q. and Chouinard and Gonthier JJ.A. unanimously allowed the respondents' appeal on the s. 133 issue:  [1990] R.J.Q. 309, 28 Q.A.C. 86, 47 M.P.L.R. 275 (hereinafter cited to R.J.Q.).  Writing for the court, Chouinard J.A. decided that the order providing for the issuance of letters patent, and the letters patent themselves, and the notice of issuance of the letters patent, were legislative in character, and hence were of no force and effect for failure to conform to s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .  In view of this conclusion, he did not consider it necessary to decide whether the order in lieu of the draft agreement was subject to s. 133 as well.

 

                   The Attorney General of Quebec now appeals to this Court from the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal.  Before this Court, the respondents raised again various arguments based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, in addition to the s. 133 issue.  At the hearing of this appeal, we were all of the opinion that these supplementary arguments were without merit, and we gave partial judgment from the bench answering constitutional questions 2 to 5 in the negative:  Sinclair v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 134.  This appeal, accordingly, falls to be decided on the s. 133 issue alone, and consequently this is the only issue that it will be necessary to address in these reasons.

 

Issues

 

                   The first constitutional question reads:

 

1.  Are the following documents subject to the requirements of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 ?

 

(a) the order issued by the Minister of Municipal Affairs postponing the election in the    city of Rouyn, pursuant to s. 19 of the Act respecting the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, S.Q. 1985, c. 48 (Bill 190);

 

(b) the order issued by the Minister of Municipal Affairs in lieu of a draft agreement between the cities of Rouyn and Noranda, pursuant to s. 4, para. 3 of Bill 190;

 

(c) the order in council providing for the issue of letters patent for the city of Rouyn-Noranda, pursuant to s. 14 of Bill 190;

 

(d) the letters patent for the city of Rouyn-Noranda;

 

(e) the notice of issue of the letters patent for the city of Rouyn-Noranda, as provided by s. 15 of Bill 190.

 

                   All these instruments were printed and made in the French language only.  Therefore, if any or all of them were indeed subject to s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 , it follows that they were, and are, nullities.

 

Analysis

 

Section 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867  reads as follows:

 

                   133.   Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

 

                   The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both of those Languages.

 

                   In Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 000, this Court reaffirmed the position adopted in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at p. 739, that the purpose of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867  is "to ensure full and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for francophones and anglophones alike."  Section 133, therefore, must be read to apply not only to statutes in the strict sense, but equally to all other instruments of a legislative nature.  In the 1992 Manitoba Language Reference, we decided that the class of instruments having a legislative character might include certain orders in council and documents incorporated into statutes by reference.  More generally, we decided that it is not the form of the instrument, but, rather, the degree of "connection between the legislature and the instrument [which] is indicative of a legislative nature" (p. 000).

 

                   With respect to the content and effect of an instrument, we decided that the following characteristics are further badges of its legislative character (at p. 000):

 

1.                The instrument embodies a rule of conduct;

 

2.                The instrument has the force of law; and

 

3.                The instrument applies to an undetermined number of persons.

 

                   The Attorney General of Quebec does not dispute this general definition.  Indeed, in its factum, the following definition of legislative instruments, as opposed to executive acts is adopted from the  Regulations Act, R.S.Q., c. R-18.1, s. 1:

 

A normative instrument of a general and impersonal nature, made under an Act and having force of law when it is in effect.

 

                   The question, therefore, is whether the instruments in question in this appeal possess these characteristics.  At the outset, however, and prior to embarking upon an examination of the five instruments here in question, we should point out that, as we said in the 1992 Manitoba Language Reference, the courts will not permit the circumvention of s. 133 by means of a disingenuous division of a legislative act into a number of discrete parts -- for instance, a "shell" statute incorporating by reference some other "non-legislative" unilingual document.  To do otherwise would to be to invite the triumph of form over substance.  As we told the Government of Manitoba, if the net effect of a series of discrete acts has a legislative character, then each of these component acts will also be imbued with this same character.  Each will be subject to the requirement of mandatory bilingualism imposed by s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .

 

(1)  Order Providing for the Issuance of Letters Patent

 

                   It was contemplated by s. 14 of Bill 190, that in the event of a favourable referendum result, the government would issue letters patent creating the new municipal corporation of Rouyn-Noranda.  The appellant Attorney General of Quebec takes the position that the governmental order accomplishing this cannot be said to have possessed legislative character.  According to the appellant, the concept of a "legislative act" presupposes the existence of a legislator who possesses a discretion to act, or not to act.  However, s. 14 of Bill 190 is cast in mandatory terms.  In other words, the Attorney General of Quebec takes the position that, once a favourable referendum result had been recorded, the Government of Quebec had no discretion but to decree the issuance of letters patent creating the new city of Rouyn-Noranda.  This absence of discretion, it is argued, is incompatible with the concept of a legislative act.  Instead, in issuing the letters patent, the Government of Quebec exercised a mere "non-discretionary power" (pouvoir lié) of an administrative or executive nature.  Hence, it is argued that the order issuing the letters patent was not subject to the requirement of bilingualism imposed by s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .

 

                   The Court of Appeal of Quebec considered this argument, and rejected it.  The language of s. 14 of Bill 190 imposed no affirmative obligation upon the Minister to issue the letters patent in the event of a favourable referendum result, and he could not have been compelled to do so by mandamus.  For the court, Chouinard J.A. said (at p. 316):

 

[translation] ... despite the language used in s. 14, the words "the Government shall order" must be read as meaning "the Government may order".  With the same latitude as in the case of a by‑law which requires government approval, the government has the power to issue or withhold letters patent which it is prohibited from amending, since this discretion was reserved to the Minister by Bill 190, s. 4, for purposes of completing the draft agreement.  The procedure seems to me to be an example of delegated legislation which is an essential part of Bill 190;

 

                   We agree with the Court of Appeal that, in issuing the letters patent, the Minister was not exercising a mere "non-discretionary power" but was exercising a discretionary power which had a legislative character.  More fundamentally, however, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the National Assembly of Quebec has attempted to divide the legislative process into a number of discrete steps, and then to claim that each of these individual steps, considered alone and in isolation, lacks a legislative character.  Chouinard J.A. said (at p. 317):

 

[translation] The process adopted by the legislature has the characteristics of delegated legislation, in the sense that it has divided the law into separate but necessary stages, the third and fourth surely being delegated legislation.  It should be noted that the second stage was the order of the Minister of Municipal Affairs completing the draft agreement, the third the order of the government ordering the amalgamation, and the fourth the notice of issuance of letters patent and their publication in the Gazette officielle.

 

                   We agree with this assessment.  As we have already emphasized, it is not permissible to assess the character of the component parts of the legislative process individually and in isolation in order to determine whether s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867  has been complied with.  Rather, it is the character of the whole which determines the nature of the parts.

 

(2) Letters Patent

 

                   The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's submission that the letters patent creating the new municipal corporation of Rouyn-Noranda were an executive instrument, analogous to letters patent creating a private company.  Instead, they created a new juridical framework within which new municipal institutions would function determining the rights and liabilities of citizens.  For the court, Chouinard J.A. said (at pp. 318-19):

 

                   [translation] Unlike incorporating documents, it seems to me that the series of normative provisions contained in the letters patent under consideration prevents them from being characterized as administrative acts.

 

                                                                    ...

 

Ordinary letters patent creating municipal corporations are regulatory in nature; a fortiori those issued on an exceptional basis, without the consent of the municipal corporations of Rouyn and Noranda.

 

                   An instrument which creates new local governmental institutions cannot escape the operation of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867  simply by a circuitous path of enactment.  Had the National Assembly chosen to amalgamate Rouyn and Noranda on terms imposed by statute, this statute, and these terms, would have been required to be published in the French and English languages.  This requirement cannot be circumvented by following the procedure that the Government of Quebec saw fit to adopt.

 

(3) Notice of Issuance of the Letters Patent

 

                   Since the letters patent themselves were of a legislative nature, then, clearly, the notice of their issuance published in the Gazette officielle du Québec, (1986) 118 G.O. I 3344, was also subject to the requirement of mandatory bilingualism.  We agree with Chouinard J.A.'s conclusion on this issue that (at p. 316):

 

[translation] ... in this regard order 511 and the notice of publication of the letters patent in the Gazette officielle du Québec were subject to the same requirements as the law, including that of publication in both languages in accordance with s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .

 

                   The publication of the notice of the issuance of the letters patent creating the new municipal corporation of Rouyn-Noranda, like notice of any other legislative instrument, ought to have been in both the French and English languages.

 

(4) Order in Lieu of Draft Agreement

 

                   In view of his conclusions in respect of the letters patent and the notice of their issuance, Chouinard J.A. did not consider it necessary to rule on the character of the ministerial order establishing the terms of amalgamation to be voted on in the referendum.  However, we have no doubt that this instrument, as well, was of a legislative nature and therefore subject to the requirements of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .  In the first place, this order was an integral part of a process which, when viewed as a whole, was legislative.  We would emphasize again that the character of the parts is governed by the nature of the whole.

 

                   More fundamentally, it is clear that the order in lieu of a draft agreement was an integral part of Bill 190 and was subject to s. 133.  Bill 190 mandated the amalgamation of Rouyn and Noranda, but stipulated no terms and conditions.  These were subject to later determination by the Minister.  The situation is analogous to that in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Brunet, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 260, where the statute in question imposed a collective agreement, the terms and conditions of which could only be found elsewhere in unilingual sessional papers.  A citizen voting in the referendum of March 23, 1986 would have had official notification of the terms and conditions he or she was voting for or against in the French language only.

 

                   Bill 190 is virtually a "shell" statute if considered by itself.  Indeed, the only salient difference between Bill 190 and the situation in Brunet is that the challenged statutes in Brunet incorporated by reference unilingual documents already in existence, whereas Bill 190 incorporated by reference a unilingual document which the Minister of Municipal Affairs had yet to issue.  If anything, this is a worse abuse than occurred in Brunet.  We are all of the opinion, therefore, that the order in lieu of a draft agreement is properly considered as an integral part of Bill 190, and was subject to the requirements of s. 133.

 

(5) Order Postponing the Election

 

                   As already noted, on September 4, 1985, the Minister issued the order as provided for by s. 19 of Bill 190, postponing the municipal elections in the city of Rouyn in contemplation of the referendum on amalgamation.  This ministerial order does not appear to have been published in either of the official languages.

 

                   Viewed in isolation, it would not immediately be clear that this order constituted a legislative act.  However, as has already been made clear, it is incorrect to view individually the component parts of what is essentially a legislative process.  The postponement of municipal elections in Rouyn was as much a part of the entire legislative scheme for amalgamation as the referendum, the issuance of the letters patent, and the notice of their issuance in the Gazette officielle du Québec.  One cannot excise this step from the rest of the process for the purposes of the operation of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 .  Consequently, we are of the opinion that the ministerial order of September 4, 1985, like the other instruments under challenge in this appeal, was of a legislative nature and ought to have been published in the French and English languages.

 

Conclusions and Remedy

 

                   All of the instruments challenged by the respondents in this appeal, from the ministerial order postponing the municipal elections in Rouyn, to the final notification of the issuance of the letters patent for the city of Rouyn-Noranda in the Gazette officielle du Québec, were part of a process which, when viewed in its entirety, was undoubtedly legislative.  Accordingly, all of them were subject to the requirements of s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 , no less than was Bill 190 itself.  The requirements of s. 133 cannot be circumvented by the disingenuous division of the legislative process into a series of discrete steps, and then claiming that each of these steps, when examined in isolation, lacks a legislative character.

 

                   All of the instruments in question were printed and published in the French language only, or were not officially published at all.  Clearly, therefore, the requirements of s. 133 were not complied with.  It follows that all of them are, and have always been, nullities and of no legal force and effect.  One cannot ignore, however, that, de facto, a new city of Rouyn-Noranda has been in existence since 1986, operating on the faith of purported letters patent establishing its constitution.  This purported municipal constitution, and consequently all acts performed pursuant to it are, and have been, illegal and of no force and effect.

 

                   It would be wrong to throw the affairs of the citizens of Rouyn and Noranda into a state of chaos on account of the procedure chosen by the National Assembly of Quebec to effect their purported amalgamation into the new city of Rouyn-Noranda.  This is an appropriate case for this Court to exercise its suspensive power by declaring that the instruments in this appeal, while invalid for non-compliance with s. 133  of the Constitution Act, 1867 , shall continue in force for a period of time in order to permit the National Assembly to take  what steps it sees fit to remedy the constitutional defects.  This period of time shall be for one year from the date of this judgment.

 

                   The appeal is dismissed.  The Attorney General of Quebec will pay the costs of the respondents on the basis set out in the order granting leave to appellant.

 

                   Appeal dismissed.

 

                   Solicitors for the appellant:  Jean‑Yves Bernard, Louis Rochette and Marise Visocchi, Ste‑Foy.

 

                   Solicitors for the respondents:  Bertrand, Larochelle, Québec.

 

                   Solicitors for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada:  Jean‑Marc Aubry, Martin Low and René LeBlanc, Ottawa.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba:  The Department of Justice, Winnipeg.

 

                   Solicitor for the intervener Alliance Quebec:  Stephen A. Scott, Montréal.

 

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