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20 result(s)
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1.
R. v. Keegstra - [1990] 3 SCR 697 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
A second important element of s. 319(2) is its requirement that the promotion of hatred be "wilful". [...] It will be observed that what is prohibited is the wilful promotion of hatred of identifiable groups. [...] But "hatred" does not stand alone. To convict, it must have been "wilfully promote[d]".
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2.
R. v. Andrews - [1990] 3 SCR 870 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
The accused were charged with the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code . [...] The wilful promotion of hatred even more than the spreading of false news is entirely antithetical to our very system of freedom. [...] The appellants were convicted of the offence of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group (s. 319(2) of the Code).
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3.
R. v. Krymowski - 2005 SCC 7 - [2005] 1 SCR 101 - 2005-02-24
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
The gist of the offence under s. 319(2) is the wilful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. [...] 13 The gist of the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code is the wilful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. [...] (2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
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4.
R. v. Zundel - [1992] 2 SCR 731 - 1992-08-27
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
Section 181 catches not only deliberate falsehoods which promote hatred, but sanctions all false assertions which the prosecutor believes `likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest', regardless of whether they promote the values underlying s. 2 (b). [...] It is enough that those who publicly and wilfully promote hatred convey or attempt to convey a meaning . . . . [...] There is very little chance that statements intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group are true, or that their vision of society will lead to a better world.
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5.
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) - 2005 SCC 40 - [2005] 2 SCR 100 - 2005-06-28
Supreme Court JudgmentsAdministrative law
Criminal law
Immigration
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of [an offence]. [...] (1) is something less than intentional promotion of hatred. On the other hand, the use of the word “wilfully” in subs. [...] (2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
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6.
Canada (human Rights Commission) v. Taylor - [1990] 3 SCR 892 - 1990-12-13
Supreme Court JudgmentsAdministrative law
Constitutional law
In Keegstra, I dealt in considerable detail with hate propaganda and the defence of truth, though in relation to the criminal offence of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group. [...] The most significant is the means by which the promotion of hatred is to be curbed. [...] In Keegstra and Andrews, the method at issue was the criminalization of wilful attempts to promote hatred against groups.
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7.
R. v. Keegstra - [1995] 2 SCR 381 - 1995-05-18
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
K was found guilty of wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code . [...] L.R. (3d) 4, 157 A.R. 1, 77 W.A.C. 1, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 505, allowing the accused's appeal from his conviction for wilful promotion of hatred and ordering a new trial. [...] (2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
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8.
R. v. Hamilton - 2005 SCC 47 - [2005] 2 SCR 432 - 2005-07-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In that case, the constitutional validity of s. 319(2), which prohibits communications that wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group, was challenged on the basis that it unduly restricted the freedom of expression under s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [...] The Court adopted a stringent standard, noting that the limitation on the mens rea required to convict for “wilfully promoting hatred” was a key factor in minimizing the impairment of freedom of expression caused by that provision. [...] Dickson C.J. noted that the requirement that the speaker subjectively intend that his speech promote hatred “significantly restricts the reach of the provision, and thereby reduces the scope of the targeted expression” (p. 775).
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9.
R. v. Lucas - [1998] 1 SCR 439 - 1998-04-02
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
I cannot think of a more rational way to protect the reputation of individuals from wilful and false attack than the creation of the aggravated offence crafted by the committee. [...] This approach to s. 2 (b) often operates to leave unexamined the extent to which the expression at stake in a particular case promotes freedom of expression principles. [...] In addressing the value to be given to a communication intended to promote hatred against identifiable groups, Dickson C.J. stated, at p. 765:
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10.
Hansman v. Neufeld - 2023 SCC 14 - 2023-05-19
Supreme Court JudgmentsCourts
At trial, Mr. Hansman need not demonstrate that Mr. Neufeld is bigoted, transphobic, promoted hatred, or created an unsafe environment for students. [...] [113] Additionally, Mr. Neufeld contends that because the Criminal Code recognizes an offence of wilful promotion of hatred (see s. 319(2)), the allegation that he “tip toed . . . into hate speech” would be taken as imputing criminal liability. [...] Sometimes our beliefs, values, and responsibilities as professional educators are challenged by those who promote hatred.
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11.
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) - [1998] 1 SCR 877 - 1998-05-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
126. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament by wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not [...] To view hate propaganda as “victimless” in the absence of any proof that it moved its listeners to hatred is to discount the wrenching impact that it may have on members of the target group themselves. [...] These considerations undermine the notion that we can draw a bright line between provisions which are justifiable because they require proof that hatred actually resulted, and provisions which are unjustifiable because they require only an intent to promote hatred.
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12.
Ward v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) - 2021 SCC 43 - 2021-10-29
Supreme Court Judgments(a) to promote recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family; and [...] The complainants, who had received the flyers at their homes, argued that the material promoted hatred against individuals because of their sexual orientation — a prohibited ground recognized by the Saskatchewan statute. [...] Wrapping such discriminatory conduct in the protective cloak of speech does not make it any less intolerable when that speech amounts to wilful emotional abuse of a disabled child.
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13.
Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. - [1995] 2 SCR 1031 - 1995-07-20
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, for instance, the defences established in s. 319(3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , to prosecutions for "wilfully promoting hatred" under s. 319(2) provided considerable assistance in interpreting the ambit of the offence in s. 319(2) . [...] [The s. 319(3) ] defences are ... intended to aid in making the scope of the wilful promotion of hatred more explicit; individuals engaging in the type of expression described [in s. 319(3) ] are thus given a strong signal that their activity will not be swept into the ambit of the offence. [...] In particular, a deferential approach should be taken in relation to legislative enactments with legitimate social policy objectives, in order to avoid impeding the state's ability to pursue and promote those objectives (at p. 642).
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14.
R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer - 2001 SCC 42 - [2001] 2 SCR 344 - 2001-06-29
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
139. (1) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice in a judicial proceeding, [...] 50 The first reason supporting the need for secrecy is that confidentiality promotes candour and the kind of full and frank debate that is essential to this type of collegial decision making. [...] While searching for unanimity, jurors should be free to explore out loud all avenues of reasoning without fear of exposure to public ridicule, contempt or hatred.
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15.
R. v. Sharpe - 2001 SCC 2 - [2001] 1 SCR 45 - 2001-01-26
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
For example, in Keegstra, supra, the impugned legislation prohibited the willful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group. [...] Government sponsored hatred on group grounds would violate section 15 of the Charter . [...] Parliament promotes equality and moves against inequality when it prohibits the wilful public promotion of group hatred on these grounds.
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16.
R. v. Chartrand - [1994] 2 SCR 864 - 1994-07-14
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.), although in the context of wilful promotion of hatred, Martin J.A. stated at pp. 384-85:
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17.
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society - [1992] 2 SCR 606 - 1992-07-09
Supreme Court JudgmentsAppeal
Competition law
Constitutional law
It had been argued that s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , was too broad in its ambit ("wilfully promot[ing] hatred against any identifiable group"), and could include expression that bears no relationship with Parliament's objective in enacting the statute. [...] . . . Mens rea focuses on the mental state of the accused and requires proof of a positive state of mind such as intent, recklessness or wilful blindness.
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18.
Bulletin Co. v Sheppard - (1917) 55 SCR 454 - 1917-06-22
Supreme Court JudgmentsTorts
As any one of experience knows, the formation of these committees was perhaps the most important step of the year, either to promote the general good or the strengthening the hands of the mayor, or someone else, bent on dominating the council. [...] written words which expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy [...] They amount to allegations of disgraceful and corrupt conduct by the plaintiff and of grave and wilful breaches of the trust committed to him as an alderman in consciously and deliberately participating in the misuse of public moneys.
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19.
R. v. Friesen - 2020 SCC 9 - [2020] 1 SCR 424 - 2020-04-02
Supreme Court JudgmentsCriminal law
In order to promote the uniform application of the law of sentencing, the following non‐exhaustive significant factors to determine a fit sentence for sexual offences against children must be considered. [...] In assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender, courts must take into account the harm the offender intended or was reckless or wilfully blind to (Arcand, at para. 58; see also M. (C.A.), at para. 80; Morrisey, at para. 48). [...] [180] Finally, we wish to comment briefly on the statement by Friesen’s former girlfriend to the author of the pre-sentence report that Friesen had a “hatred” for women (A.R., at p. 90).
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20.
R. v. Finta - [1994] 1 SCR 701 - 1994-03-24
Supreme Court JudgmentsConstitutional law
Criminal law
The normal mens rea for confinement, robbery, manslaughter, or kidnapping, whether it be intention, knowledge, recklessness or wilful blindness, is adequate. [...] The central concern in the case of crimes against humanity is with such things as state-sponsored or sanctioned persecution, not the private individual who has a particular hatred against a particular group or the public generally. [...] On April 5, 1942, he was promoted to the rank of captain. He was transferred to Szeged as the commander of an investigative unit of the Gendarmerie.